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Overview
This thesis aims to investigate C. Frith’s (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of 
schizophrenia by using the schizotypy paradigm to test the model’s predictions in a non- 
clinical sample. The thesis is divided into three parts.
Part 1 begins with a summary of the notion of Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer 
one’s own and others’ mental states. Its main theoretical conceptualisations are 
discussed, as well as a range of ToM measures, and how ToM has been linked to 
Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Next, Frith’s model is described, followed by the 
predictions made by the model. The evidence that has been generated through past 
empirical studies is then reviewed and methodological weaknesses in these studies 
discussed. Finally, the schizotypy paradigm is introduced and details of previous studies 
that have used it to test the predictions of Frith’s theory are given.
Part 2 presents the empirical paper, an investigation into whether ToM ability is 
associated with those schizotypal traits hypothesised to be analogous to symptoms of 
schizophrenia. This was done through the administering of ToM tasks requiring the 
understanding of double bluff, deception, white lies and irony. The results of the study 
are reported and discussed in the light of the predictions made by Frith’s (1992) model.
Part 3 provides an opportunity for further reflection on several points of interest arising 
from Parts 1 and 2, in the form of a critical appraisal.
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Part 1: Review paper
1. Abstract
Frith’s (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia proposed that the 
symptoms characteristic of that disorder can be accounted for in terms of differing 
degrees of theory of mind impairment. There is a large body of evidence indicating that 
individuals with schizophrenia perform poorly on tasks that are hypothesised to require a 
functioning theory of mind, and this review aims to introduce the main findings from 
these studies.
Following consideration of thirty-four relevant papers, this review finds that the only 
unequivocal finding is that individuals with schizophrenia do show impaired theory of 
mind. How this impairment relates to schizophrenic symptomatology as predicted by 
Frith’s model is far less certain, and several methodological limitations are discussed 
that could account for this uncertainty, before a new development in the field is 
introduced: the use of the schizotypy paradigm to test the predictions of Frith’s theory in 
non-clinical samples. The schizotypy paradigm has been employed in three studies 
investigating ToM performance in healthy individuals to date (Langdon and Coltheart, 
1999; Langdon and Coltheart, 2004; Pickup, 2006), and the findings from these studies 
show that schizotypal traits do influence ToM performance. These studies are reviewed, 
and future directions for research are recommended.
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2. Introduction
This paper reviews the research evidence for a possible link between Theory of Mind 
(ToM) deficits and the impairments associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, with a 
view to exploring a recent development in the investigation of schizophrenia- the use of 
the schizotypy paradigm.
Chris Frith (1987; 1992) first put forward a coherent theory postulating such a link, and 
since its publication a substantial body of research has been developed in this area. A 
detailed review of this research base in its entirety is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Therefore, while the main findings from the wider literature are reported to provide the 
appropriate context, the focus here is the literature concerning impairments of the 
interpretation of indirect speech in individuals with schizophrenia.
Firstly, a brief outline of the theoretical underpinnings to the research base is provided, 
before the main findings from the literature are outlined. Then, important 
methodological issues in the literature are considered, before a more detailed exploration 
of indirect speech interpretation and schizophrenia is undertaken. This is followed by a 
summary of the new developments in the area of schizotypy, and how this concept has 
been utilised in schizophrenia research, in particular research into ToM impairments in 
schizophrenia. Suggestions for further research are then given.
Formal systematic review methodology such as devising a focused, four part review 
question involving patients, interventions, comparisons and outcomes, having two 
reviewers screening titles and abstracts and reading full-text articles, computing inter-
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rater reliability and carrying out statistical analyses of studies’ data (Pai et al., 2004) was 
beyond the scope of this paper.
Papers for this review were identified through searches of Medline and Psychlnfo, using 
search terms including “theory of mind and schizophrenia/schizotypy”, “mentalising and 
schizophrenia/schizotypy”, “metarepresentation and schizophrenia/schizotypy”, and 
through other recently published reviews of the literature.
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3. Theory of Mind
3.1 Background
The term ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) was first used by Premack and Woodruff (1978) 
during their work with chimpanzees, and involves both the recognition that people act 
on the basis of mental states, i.e. beliefs, desires etc, and the attribution of these states to 
oneself and others in order to explain and predict behaviours. There are, therefore, 
different aspects to this mental-state inferring process. These have been described using 
various terminologies. For example, ‘metarepresentation’ has been defined by Frith 
(1992) as the internal, mental representation of ourselves and others as conscious beings 
who mentally represent external reality. Langdon and Coltheart (1999) defined the 
ability to infer states of mind, in other words to use ToM, as ‘mentalising’, a term first 
used by U. Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) in their study of children with autism. 
Mentalising would be impossible without the ability to engage in metarepresentation, so 
these are terms that describe different aspects of the ToM process.
It has been argued from an evolutionary perspective that ToM may have emerged as an 
adaptive response to living in an increasingly complex social world. This greater degree 
of sociality may have been an advantage for individuals in terms of increased protection 
from predators but a difficulty could have been how to behave in such a way that 
reproductive success was maximised. From an evolutionary perspective, the need to pass 
on one’s genes through reproduction is of paramount importance. Individuals who are 
able to represent others’ states of mind, and in this way ‘read’ others’ minds, may be 
able to operate in this complex social environment with a greater degree of mastery, thus 
leading to greater social and, therefore, reproductive success (Briine, 2005a). This
14
greater mastery could be due to either an improved capacity for “social grooming” 
(Dunbar, 1996) or the detection of intentional deception by peers (Byrne, 2003).
3,2 Theoretical underpinnings
There are several different theoretical conceptualisations of ToM. Scholl and Leslie 
(1999) proposed the existence of a ToM module (ToMM), following Fodor’s (1983) 
concept of a modular organisation of the mind. In their theory, the ToMM processes 
information that is restricted to social inference. Scholl and Leslie (1999) argued that the 
accurate functioning of the module depends on a selection processor to separate relevant 
from irrelevant contextual information.
By contrast, Pemer (1991) put forward the “metarepresentational” theory-theory. This 
non-modular model suggested that different levels of representational skill are acquired 
in steps during normal child development. The first step is the acquisition of primary 
representations of the self as an acting agent. Secondary representation allows for the 
discrimination of hypothetical from real situations. In other words, a theory is employed 
to make attributions of mental states of others. Within Pemer’s model, an individual’s 
understanding of their mind is a framework or a theory analogous to scientific theories 
(Gopnik and Wellman, 1994).
The third theoretical framework is the “simulation” theory. This theory proposed that 
ToM relates to the ability to imaginatively “put oneself in others’ shoes” (Davies and 
Stone, 1995). In this theory, an individual’s ability to attribute their own mental states in 
a given scenario is used to simulate what another person may be thinking in a similar
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situation. Gordon (1995) proposed that the brain actually begins to function like the 
other’s brain by generating similar processes in the self. The recent discovery of ‘mirror 
neurons’, which fire both when an action is carried out by an individual and when that 
individual observes the same action being carried out by another (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese & Fogassi, 1996), may lend weight to this theory.
3.3 Measuring theory of mind
The ‘gold standard’ test of comprehending other people’s minds is the ability to show 
the understanding that others can hold false beliefs that are different from one’s own 
correct knowledge (Dennett, 1978). The classic test, developed by Wimmer and Pemer 
(1983), is called the Sally and Anne Test. In this test, one character, Anne, hides an 
object while a second character, Sally, is out of the room. The person being tested has to 
decide whether Sally would look for the object in the place that she knew it was in 
before she left, or would look in the place that Anne had hidden it. In other words, the 
individual must be able to distinguish between their own correct knowledge and Sally’s 
false knowledge. This is a first order false belief test, as it requires the ability to 
“metarepresent” Sally’s mental state, i.e. to understand that “Sally thinks that...”.
Other tests of ToM involve the understanding of higher order false belief tasks, 
metaphor, irony and faux pas. A second order false belief test would explore an 
understanding of what a character thinks about a different character’s thoughts, for 
example, “Michael thinks that Sophie thinks that.. The understanding of irony is said 
to involve second order ToM because the listener must go beyond the literal meaning of 
the words used by the speaker and infer what the speaker might have actually intended
16
(Briine, 2005a). Similarly, metaphor, jokes, faux pas and so on all involve the ability to 
infer a meaning that is not explicit in the actual words used, and all have been used as 
tests of ToM ability.
3.4 Clinical application in autism
ToM has been most extensively researched in the area of Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD). An absence of ToM is widely held to be responsible for the triad of impairments 
that are seen in people with ASD, identified by Loma Wing (1979): impairments in 
social interaction, communication and imagination. Uta Frith (1989) proposed that a lack 
of the mechanism that allows humans to have a ToM could explain the triad. For 
example, if a child is unable to infer the mental states of others, they will be unable to 
engage in pretend or imaginative play. Without a ToM the child’s communication will 
be different from other children’s because the child would not be able to take into 
account the beliefs, intentions or mood of the person to whom they are speaking. This 
inability to take beliefs and so on into account will also severely damage the child’s 
ability to interact in the social world leading to ‘autistic aloneness’ and a lack of social 
interaction (U. Frith, 1989).
3.5 Autistic Spectrum Disorder and Schizophrenia
In their 1991 chapter, Frith and Frith pointed out that although there are clear differences 
between ASD and schizophrenia, for example the presence of hallucinations and 
delusions in schizophrenia but not in ASD, some striking similarities are also present. 
They considered that the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. social withdrawal, 
lack of communication, lack of spontaneous, creative behaviour and increased
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stereotyped activity) mapped very closely to the triad of impairments identified by Wing
(1979), and could be seen as a distinctive cluster of social, communicative and 
imaginative impairments. They further suggested that ToM impairments may also 
account for these difficulties, in the same way that ToM difficulties could account for 
Wing’s triad of impairments.
C. Frith (1992) developed this observation into a theory of schizophrenia that aimed to 
account for schizophrenic symptomatology in terms of an impairment of ToM. I will 
give an outline of his model in the following section, before discussing the research 
evidence that has accumulated following its publication.
3.6 Summary
This section gave an outline of the current thought on ToM, the ability to understand 
one’s own and others’ mental states, a skill that is hypothesised to be crucial to 
successfully negotiating the complex human social environment. Methods used to 
measure ToM were described, as was the concept of different ‘orders’ of ToM. Deficits 
in this skill have been theorised to underpin the impairments seen in Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder, and a link between ASD and schizophrenia was highlighted. The next section 
will report how Frith used this observation to develop his model of schizophrenia.
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4. Frith’s (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia
4.1 Symptom classification
There have been many attempts to classify the symptoms of schizophrenia since 
Kraepelin (1896) and, later, Bleuler (1911) described the condition. One influential 
classification has been that of Crow (1980), who divided schizophrenic symptoms into 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’. Positive symptoms were defined as being abnormal by their 
presence, such as hallucinations and delusions, while negative symptoms were defined 
by the abnormality of absence of particular behaviours. These would include flat affect 
and poverty of speech or action. After Crow, Liddle (1987) carried out factor analyses of 
symptoms and found three factors. The first he called ‘psychomotor poverty’, which 
included poverty of speech, flattening of affect and motor retardation and is similar to 
Crow’s negative subtype. The second factor, ‘reality distortion’ (delusions and 
hallucinations), and third, ‘disorganisation’ (incoherence and incongruity) were 
divisions of Crow’s positive subtype.
Within Frith’s (1992) theoretical framework, a distinction is made between the bizarre 
experiences and beliefs that a person with schizophrenia can describe (‘symptoms’) and 
the behavioural abnormalities that can be observed (‘signs’). Therefore, signs can be 
defined as behaviours associated with schizophrenia, and symptoms can be defined as 
experiences associated with schizophrenia. Frith divided the ‘signs’ of schizophrenia 
into those which are positive and negative, using the same definition of positive and 
negative used by Crow (1980). The negative signs are thus concerned with the lack of a 
behaviour, for example poverty of action or speech, flattening of affect or social 
withdrawal, while the positive signs include incoherence of speech or incongruity of
affect. In Frith’s model, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia described by Crow
(1980), i.e. hallucinations and delusions, were labelled ‘symptoms’. These were largely 
unobservable events experienced by individuals with schizophrenia and described by 
them to others.
4.2 The model
Frith (1992) proposed that there were three principal abnormalities in schizophrenia 
which could account for all of the signs and symptoms. These abnormalities were: 
disorders of willed action, disorders of self-monitoring and disorders of monitoring the 
intentions of others.
4.2.1 Disorders of willed action
Frith noted that behavioural signs seemed to occur specifically in situations in which 
patients had to generate the required actions for themselves. In other words, these 
patients may have a particular difficulty with actions that are self-initiated, while having 
little difficulty with those actions that are carried out in response to environmental 
stimuli. He proposed that three types of specific abnormality could be accounted for as a 
consequence of an impairment o f ‘willed action’. Firstly, poverty of action or speech 
might occur if a person was unable to generate a spontaneous response and so did 
nothing. Second, perseverative or stereotyped behaviour might result if a person who 
was unable to generate a spontaneous response repeated their previous response.
Thirdly, a person who was unable to generate a spontaneous response may respond 
inappropriately to an irrelevant stimulus in the environment, causing stimulus-driven 
behaviour (Frith, 1987; 1992).
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4.2.2 Disorders of self-monitoring
Frith (1992) proposed that some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, for example 
some delusions and auditory hallucinations, could be interpreted as resulting from a 
defect of self-monitoring. In the absence of an awareness of their own intentions, 
patients may experience their actions and thoughts as not being their own, and instead 
being under someone else’s control, for example in the case of delusions of control or 
thought insertion.
Auditory hallucinations, according to Frith’s model, can be thought of in a similar way. 
Patients would perceive their own thoughts or sub-vocal speech as emanating from a 
source that is not under their control, rather than recognising them as their own 
intentional speech acts. Therefore, according to Frith (1987), patients with positive 
symptoms can still act spontaneously on the basis of willed intentions, but they are no 
longer aware of these intentions.
4.2.3 Disorders in monitoring the intentions of others
Paranoid delusions and delusions of reference both occur, according to the model, as a 
result of incorrect inferences that the patient has made about the intentions of other 
people. Patients with paranoid delusions incorrectly think that other people are trying to 
harm them, while those with delusions of reference think that others are trying to 
communicate with them or are talking about them. Further, a defect in the monitoring of 
others’ intentions could lead to the behavioural sign of incoherent speech if the patient 
is unable to decide what information the other person needs in order to understand them 
(Frith, 1992).
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4.3 Frith *s model and theory of mind
In his model, Frith attempted to tie together the three cognitive mechanisms described 
above into one unified theory of schizophrenia, which would identify a single underlying 
cognitive deficit that could describe all of the features of schizophrenia. He identified 
ToM as being one such possible deficit.
Frith created an account of how a malfunctioning ToM could account for the signs and 
symptoms of schizophrenia. In line with his model, he outlined three relevant areas in 
which ToM, or metarepresentation, plays a key role. These areas were awareness of 
one’s own goals, awareness of one’s own intentions and awareness of other people’s 
intentions, and Frith theorised that these areas corresponded to the three types of 
cognitive impairment outlined above that his model suggested were the underlying cause 
of the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. Specifically, without awareness of one’s 
own goals, disorders of willed action would be caused; without awareness of one’s 
intentions, disorders of self-monitoring occur; and without an awareness of the 
intentions of others, delusions of persecution and of reference can occur.
Frith (1992) noted that autistic spectrum disorder and schizophrenia, although similar in 
some ways, differ in an important respect. This is that ASD is usually present from birth, 
whereas schizophrenia typically occurs in a person’s twenties or thirties. This means that 
in ASD the whole course of development may be shaped by the inability to infer mental 
states. However, in schizophrenia, the person knows that others have mental states and 
has experienced a working ToM during development, but then may have lost that ability 
at the onset of illness. They will still have, however, the ritual and behavioural routines
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for interacting with people that do not require any mental state inferences to be made. 
This developmental difference could lead to the same underlying defect manifesting 
itself in different ways. In particular, a person with ASD may not try to infer the mental 
states of others, while an individual with schizophrenia may continue to make inferences 
about others, but may often get these wrong (Frith, 1992).
4.4 Predictions of the model
One particular advantage of Frith’s model was that it led to a set of specific predictions 
that could be tested experimentally using tasks that require an understanding of others’ 
minds. According to the model, individuals who exhibited predominantly behavioural 
signs, either negative or positive, were hypothesised to suffer from severe and 
widespread mentalising deficits, and so should score very poorly on ToM tasks. 
Individuals with paranoid symptoms, such as persecutory delusions, and with no 
behavioural signs, were thought of within the model to have largely intact, but 
malfunctioning, ToM skills, leading to impaired performance on ToM tasks, but not as 
poor as that exhibited by those with behavioural signs. Individuals with passivity 
experiences (e.g. thought insertion, delusions of control) were predicted to show no ToM 
deficits on tests of the understanding of others’ minds, as were those in remission at the 
time of testing.
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4.5 Summary
In this section, Frith’s model was presented. Firstly, his method of grouping the 
symptomatology of schizophrenia into behavioural signs and symptoms was outlined. 
Secondly, his model of schizophrenia and how it related to ToM impairments was 
detailed. Specifically, a lack of awareness of one’s own goals could lead to disorders of 
willed action, causing behavioural signs; a lack of awareness of one’s intentions leads to 
disorders of self-monitoring, causing some auditory hallucinations and delusions; and 
lack of awareness of the intentions of others lead to delusions of persecution and 
reference. The model’s predictions with respect to performance on ToM tasks were then 
described.
In the next section, the state of the current literature will be outlined.
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5. State of the current literature
The interest generated by Frith’s (1992) model led to a large number of studies being 
published. Two recent reviews have examined these in some depth (Briine, 2005a; 
Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). A brief sketch of the main findings in the 
literature will be given here, before several key methodological issues are discussed.
5.1 Outline of the main findings
Appendix 1 gives details of all of the studies investigating ToM deficits in schizophrenia 
reviewed for this paper. Across all of these studies, there has been the consistent finding 
that, as predicted by Frith (1992), ToM deficits are indeed associated with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Many of these studies made use of tests to estimate general intelligence, 
memory, or executive function, and found that when the difficulties that individuals with 
schizophrenia have in these areas are controlled for, their ToM deficit remained. As well 
as controlling for other neuropsychological impairments, many of the studies compared 
the performance of participants with schizophrenia with the performance of individuals 
with other psychiatric diagnoses, finding in all cases that those with schizophrenia 
performed more poorly than the psychiatric controls. There is strong evidence, therefore, 
that the ToM deficit seen in schizophrenia is not accounted for by other 
neuropsychological deficits or psychiatric illnesses.
With respect to the specific predictions made in Frith’s (1992) model, the results have 
been far more equivocal. Individuals with behavioural signs have performed consistently 
more poorly than controls across several studies. This is the case for both positive 
behavioural signs such as thought disorder or disorganised symptoms (Doody, Gotz,
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Johnstone, Frith & Cunningham Owens, 1998; Grieg, Bryson & Bell, 2004; Sarfati and 
Hardy-Bayle, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche 8c Widlocher, 1997; Sarfati, Hardy- 
Bayle, Brunet & Widlocher, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Nadel, Chevalier & Widlocher, 
1997) and negative behavioural signs (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997; Corcoran, Mercer 
& Frith, 1995; Frith and Corcoran, 1996; Langdon et al., 1997; Mitchley, Barber, Gray, 
Brooks & Livingston, 1998). The picture for individuals with paranoid symptoms is 
more mixed, however. Several studies (Corcoran et al., 1995; 1997; Corcoran & Frith, 
1996; Frith 8c Corcoran, 1996; Maijoram et al., 2005; Pickup & Frith, 2001) have shown 
that patients with paranoia or persecutory delusions do show ToM deficits, while others 
have been unable to show such a link (Grieg et al., 2004; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward 8c 
Catts, 2001; Mazza, De Risio, Surian, Roncone & Casacchia, 2001; Walston, 
Blennerhassett & Charlton, 2000).
Studies that investigated patients in remission found a similarly mixed picture. While 
several showed no difference between a remitted group and controls (Corcoran et al., 
1995; 1997; Frith 8c Corcoran, 1996) other studies showed that patients in remission 
performed at the same level as patients with schizophrenia (Randall, Corcoran, Day 8c 
Bentall, 2003), and that those in remission performed more poorly than their relatives, 
who also performed more poorly than healthy controls (Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & 
van Os, 2003). This finding has since been challenged by Kelemen, Keri, Must, Benedek 
and Janka (2004), who used the Eyes test in their study comparing relatives of 
individuals with schizophrenia to controls. Using this test, they found no difference 
between relatives’ performance and the performance of controls. These mixed results
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from relatives and those in remission have led to increased debate about whether ToM 
deficits in individuals with schizophrenia constitute a state or trait deficit.
Lastly, for those patients with passivity experiences, several studies have shown a lack 
of ToM deficit, in line with Frith’s model (Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 
1996), and this appears to be a consistent finding in the literature.
In light of these findings, it is clear that the current state of the literature is characterised 
by conflicting results, with different studies reporting contradictory findings on the 
relationship between symptomatology and ToM in schizophrenia. In the following 
section, this review will investigate some methodological factors that may have 
contributed to these mixed findings.
5.2 Methodological issues in evidence base
There are several issues in the literature investigating ToM deficits in schizophrenia that 
require further consideration. Firstly, the different ways in which studies have grouped 
participants with schizophrenia for comparison, secondly the different tasks that have 
been used to test ToM, and thirdly methodological difficulties inherent in carrying out 
research with individuals with schizophrenia. These three issues will be considered in 
the following sections.
5.2.1 Schizophrenic subgroups
As outlined above, Frith’s (1992) theory made specific predictions concerning ToM 
deficits depending on the symptoms that individuals present with. Thus, positive and
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negative behavioural signs, paranoid symptoms and passivity symptoms are theorised to 
have different levels of impact on ToM ability.
In view of this, the way participants with schizophrenia are grouped for comparison may 
have an effect on the results of ToM studies. For example, individuals with passivity 
symptoms are theorised to have no difficulties with carrying out ToM tasks, while 
negative behavioural signs such as social withdrawal are theorised to be associated with 
wide-ranging ToM deficits. Therefore, if participants with social withdrawal are put into 
a “passivity” group, then their negative symptoms may bias the ToM task result for that 
group.
The difficulty is that groups of individuals with schizophrenia are extremely 
heterogeneous, with any one individual potentially exhibiting a wide range of symptoms. 
Therefore the manner in which samples are sub-divided is crucial when considering 
ToM task results. The table in appendix 1 shows how the studies reviewed here allocated 
their participants to groups.
In the first studies in this area, Frith and his colleagues (Corcoran et al., 1995; 1997; 
Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) used a hierarchical method of 
grouping individuals in order to try to address this issue, placing individuals into groups 
depending on the presence of symptoms according to the predictions of their model. 
Thus, those participants showing any behavioural signs on the day of testing were placed 
into one group, those displaying any paranoid symptoms, but no behavioural signs, were 
placed in another group and those with passivity phenomena, but no paranoid symptoms
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or behavioural signs, were placed into a third group. There may also have been a fourth 
group of individuals who were in remission at the time of testing. While this method 
prevented individuals who were hypothesised to have severe ToM deficits entering a 
group hypothesised to have lesser or no ToM deficits, it did leave open the possibility 
that the behavioural signs group was simply more severely impaired than the other two 
groups. This is because it was quite possible that members of that group would have 
behavioural signs, paranoid symptoms and passivity phenomena. If the behavioural 
signs group exhibited a wider symptom profile, then it is possible that this could have 
had an impact on their scores on ToM tasks.
Other methods have been used in the literature to form subgroups of individuals with 
schizophrenia. One such was that favoured by Sarfati and colleagues (Sarfati et al., 
1997a; 1997b; 1999; Sarfati & Hardy- Bayle, 1999). Following a theoretical model 
proposed by Hardy-Bayle (1994, cited by Sarfati et al., 1997a), they divided their 
samples depending on their scores on the Scale for Thought, Language and 
Communication Disorders. High scorers were assigned to one group, while those with 
low scores were assigned to a second group. Sarfati and colleagues described these 
groups as being high or low in “disorganisation” and drew conclusions based on this 
distinction. They also administered the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
(SAPS: Andreasen, 1982) and the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms 
(SANS: Andreasen, 1982) (Sarfati et al., 1997b) or the Positive and Negative Symptom 
Scale (PANSS: Kay, Fisz-Bein & Opler, 1987) (Sarfati et al., 1997a; 1999; Sarfati & 
Hardy-Bayle, 1999; Sarfati et al., 2000) and found no significant differences between the 
prevalence of positive and negative symptoms in the two groups. Having found no
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significant differences, they concluded that the differences in ToM and other tasks 
administered across these studies were due to their disorganisation construct. The 
difficulty with this categorisation was that it took into account only those symptoms that 
Frith described as positive behavioural signs, while not considering the impact of 
negative signs or symptoms of paranoia. Although there were no significant differences 
between the groups in terms of other symptoms, these other symptoms could still have 
had an effect at an individual level when carrying out ToM tasks, and their influence on 
group scores cannot be discounted.
Further methods of grouping participants were evident in studies carried out by Langdon 
and colleagues. For example, Harrington, Langdon, Siegert and McClure (2005) used 
scores on the SAPS and SANS to divide their sample into ‘paranoid’ and ‘non-paranoid’ 
groups, while Langdon, Coltheart, Ward and Catts (2002) used the same scales to group 
their participants according to clinical ratings of formal thought disorder. Langdon et al.
(1997) and Langdon et al. (2001) administered the SAPS and SANS and used them to 
allocate their participants according to groups that corresponded to Liddle’s (1987) three 
factors, psychomotor poverty, disorganisation and reality distortion. This methodology 
was also employed by Mazza et al. (2001). In their paper (Mazza et al., 2001), they 
published participants’ Z scores for each of Liddle’s (1987) three dimensions, showing 
how they allocated individuals to groups. This revealed the extent of the within-group 
heterogeneity. For example, the reality distortion group contained some individuals with 
high psychomotor poverty scores, the disorganisation group contained some individuals 
with high reality distortion scores and so on. It was simply an individual’s highest score 
across the three domains that led to them being allocated to a certain group. This method
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therefore carried with it the same difficulty as Sarfati’s approach, that it is difficult to 
say that the ToM scores recorded in, for example, the psychomotor poverty group were 
not biased by individuals within that group who also scored highly, albeit not as highly, 
in the other two domains.
Other studies used the PANSS to divide patients according to positive, negative and 
global symptoms (Doody et al., 1998; Mitchley et al, 1998; Briine, 2005b) or divided 
their participants according to the presence or absence of persecutory delusions (Drury, 
Robinson & Birchwood, 1998). The PANSS was also used by Herold, Tenyi, Lenard 
and Trixler (2002) in their study of patients with paranoid delusions in remission, 
although they did not report results based on this subgrouping of individuals, and by 
Randall et al. (2003) in their investigation of individuals with persecutory delusions. 
Other studies did not look at subgroups of participants with schizophrenia, preferring to 
compare groups with and without schizophrenia (Tenyi, Herold, Szili & Trixler, 2002).
In summary, studies have used a wide range of methods for allocating participants with 
schizophrenia to subgroups based on their presenting symptomatology. Due to the 
heterogeneity of samples of individuals with schizophrenia, each of these methods has 
limitations in investigating the predictions made by Frith’s (1992) model. The 
methodologies and associated limitations were discussed.
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5.2.2 ToM tasks
A second major issue in the literature is the range of different ToM tasks used. Appendix 
1 details the kinds of tasks that studies reviewed here used. There are different ways that 
one could group the tasks for comparison, and this review addresses several of these. 
Firstly it is important to consider what the tasks aim to measure, secondly in what format 
they are designed, and thirdly how they are presented to participants.
Many of the studies reviewed here (19 out of 34, see Appendix 1) used tasks that 
measured 1st and 2nd order ToM through false belief and deception. Other studies used 
tasks that aimed to tap into ToM ability in different ways, for example through the use of 
hints (e.g. Corcoran et al., 1995; Corcoran & Frith, 2003; Grieg et al., 2004; Janssen et 
al., 2003; Maijoram et al., 2005), jokes (Corcoran et al., 1997; Walston et al., 2000), the 
understanding of Gricean maxims (Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Tenyi et al., 2002), the 
understanding of the intentions of characters in comic strip cartoons (e.g. Sarfati et al. 
1997a; 1997b; 1999) and the understanding of metaphor and irony (e.g. Drury et al.,
1998, Herold et al., 2002; Mitchley et al., 1998). What these tasks have in common is 
that they all require inference, whether it be about a character’s beliefs or intentions, or 
to understand a joke or an ironical statement. It is this inference that is hypothesised to 
rely upon intact ToM.
When the design of the tasks is considered, a clear distinction arises, namely between 
verbal and non-verbal tasks. Purely verbal tasks involve only written information being 
presented to participants. Examples of this type of task include tests of Gricean maxims 
(Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Tenyi et al., 2002), the hinting task (Corcoran et al., 1995;
Corcoran & Frith, 2003) and tests of the understanding of proverbs, metaphor and irony 
(Briine & Bodenstein, 2005; Drury et al., 1998; Mitchley et al., 1998). Other tasks can 
be described as purely non-verbal. These tests use different series of pictures either in 
card-sorting tasks (e.g. Langdon et al., 1997; 2001; 2002b) or comic-strip tasks (e.g. 
Sarfati et al., 1997a; 1997b), or make use of computer animation (Russell, Reynaud, 
Herba, Morris & Corcoran, 2006). A third category of task design mixes verbal and non­
verbal tasks. Examples of these types of tasks are Corcoran et al.’s (1997) jokes, or the 
large numbers of studies that presented false belief tasks in verbal form accompanied by 
props that depicted the action in the stories, which were read aloud to participants. These 
props could be in the form of Playmobil figures (Pickup & Frith, 2001), cartoon 
drawings (e.g. Harrington et al., 2005a; Pollice et al., 2002) or maps and dolls (e.g. 
Doody et al, 1998).
Lastly, the mode of presentation to participants will be discussed. The way in which 
tasks are presented is crucial because of the tension that exists between experimental 
control and ecological validity. As noted above, some tasks involve the presentation of 
written material to participants (e.g. Corcoran & Frith, 1996). Participants are able to 
read this information as many times as they wish, and the same applies to many of the 
tasks involving the presentation of picture cards for sorting (e.g. Briine, 2005b) and to 
the comic-strip designs (Sarfati et al., 1997a; 1997b). This methodology aims to 
minimise the effects of poor memory or executive function skills, but in doing so it also 
reduces the necessity of participants to rely on “on-line” processing, and allows them the 
option of using other problem-solving strategies (Pickup & Frith, 2001). The studies that 
read tasks to their participants with accompanying props were also attempting to control
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for poor memory skills, but again they lessened the reliance on participants’ on-line 
skills. However, it is these skills that the tests are targeting, because in the real-life social 
situations that individuals with schizophrenia find difficult, it is their on-line skills that 
are being called upon (Russell et al., 2006). One recent study attempted to address these 
concerns by using a dynamic intentional movement interpretation task (Russell et al., 
2006). In this task participants watched the movement of animated triangles and were 
asked to describe those movements, thus increasing the degree to which the task 
represented ‘real world’ processing skills.
There are two reasons that the use of such a wide range of tests is problematic. Firstly, as 
Harrington et al. (2005b) pointed out, it is highly unlikely that ToM ability is a unitary 
construct, and that all the different tasks used to assess ability were measuring the same 
thing. Secondly, the use of these tests has not been accompanied by a rigorous approach 
to assessing the tests’ psychometric properties. Tests have often been selected because of 
their previous use with children in Autistic Spectrum Disorder research, but there has 
been no attempt to establish their psychometric properties for use with adult populations 
(Harrington et al., 2005b).
5.2,3 Difficulties carrying out research with individuals with schizophrenia
As well as the difficulties with the specific methodologies outlined above, there are 
more general problems to be considered when carrying out research with this population. 
Firstly, as the table in appendix 1 shows, many of the studies were only able to recruit 
rather small samples, and the sample sizes became even smaller when individuals were 
allocated to subgroups for comparison. Small Ns are unlikely to give sufficient power to
carry out statistical analyses and therefore conclusions drawn using such small samples 
should be considered tentatively. Secondly, as with all studies that recruit participants 
with current mental health difficulties, a number of confounding factors should be noted. 
These include the effects of active symptoms and the effects of neuroleptic medication 
on task concentration and attention. Further, different studies included differing 
proportions of participants who were inpatients on acute psychiatric wards. They did 
not, however, specify how many, or more importantly which, participants’ results may 
have been affected by the added emotional stress that inpatient status may bring with it, 
and whether the results of subgroup analyses may have been biased by these effects.
5.3 Summary
This section has given a brief outline of the major findings in the literature on ToM in 
schizophrenia. The headline finding has been that people with schizophrenia consistently 
perform poorly on ToM tasks. Individuals with passivity phenomena have not shown a 
ToM deficit, and several studies have shown an association between positive and 
negative behavioural signs and poor performance on ToM tasks in line with Frith’s 
(1992) theory. However, other studies have not and the results for individuals with 
paranoid symptoms and those in remission have also been conflicting. Several major 
issues in the literature on schizophrenia and ToM that may have contributed to its 
ambiguous and rather confusing current state were then highlighted. These issues are the 
different ways of grouping heterogeneous samples of individuals with schizophrenia, the 
proliferation of different kinds of ToM tests, and issues inherent in recruiting 
participants with mental health difficulties. The following section will look at the current 
evidence in one specific domain of schizophrenia and ToM research which, it will be
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argued, may be able to provide some of the best evidence for Frith’s (1992) theory: 
those studies that tested ToM through the use of tests involving the interpretation of 
indirect speech.
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6. Indirect speech
6.1 Background
The previous section highlighted in part the question of the ecological validity of ToM 
tests. As stated previously, the context of the development of Frith’s (1992) theory was 
the observation of the behavioural similarities between schizophrenia and Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder. Indeed, the term ‘autism’ was originally coined to describe the 
socially cut off nature of people with schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1911). It is the primarily 
social difficulties that individuals with schizophrenia experience that are so striking.
In view of this, and due to the need for ToM tests to have ecological validity, this review 
now considers those studies that have investigated the ability of individuals with 
schizophrenia to appreciate indirect speech. Making the inferences that are necessary to 
decode indirect speech is a crucial part of normal (‘on-line’) social interaction. Tests that 
require such inferences to be made may, therefore, have greater real-world relevance to 
this group. A very brief history of the field will be given before a more detailed account 
of the literature is explored.
Pragmatics is the field that studies the ways in which people interpret speech using non- 
linguistic knowledge and inference that conveys meaning beyond the literal meaning of 
the words used. Pragmatics can be said to have begun with the work of Grice (1975), 
who proposed a ‘Cooperative principle’, and a set of nine maxims that he theorised were 
assumed in linguistic interactions in order for meaning to be conveyed and understood. 
Examples of these maxims are the maxim of quantity (i.e. be as informative as required 
but not more informative than required) and the maxim of quality (i.e. do not say what
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you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which you have insufficient 
evidence). In post-Gricean pragmatics, the work of Sperber and Wilson (1995) and their 
Communicative Principle of Relevance was important. An explanation of this detailed 
theory is beyond the scope of this paper, and readers are directed to Sperber and Wilson 
(1995). Relevant here is that in order for a hearer to understand indirect speech, they 
must hold in mind the hypothesis that the speaker is capable of entertaining thoughts 
about, and adopting attitudes towards, the thoughts of other people.
Because of the solid theoretical background to the study of indirect speech, its links with 
ToM ability (Langdon, Davies & Coltheart, 2002) and the communicative disturbances 
that are considered to be hallmark features of schizophrenia, indirect speech is an area of 
study that should lend itself well to researching ToM capabilities in schizophrenia. If 
this is the case, studies using this methodology should provide some of the best tests of 
Frith’s theory.
6,2 Indirect speech in the literature
Patients with schizophrenia have been known for many years to have difficulties in 
pragmatic comprehension (Kasanin, 1944, cited in Langdon et al., 2002a). Since 
researchers began to study ToM deficits in schizophrenia, indirect language 
comprehension has been used in a variety of studies as a test of ToM ability. This review 
will group these studies primarily according to the type of test of indirect speech used, 
but will describe separately those studies that did and those that did not divide their 
participants with schizophrenia into groups according to their symptoms, because those 
that did are more directly relevant to an understanding of Frith’s theory.
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6.2.1 The Hinting Task
6.2.1.1 Studies that investigated symptom-based subgroups
Corcoran et al. (1995) devised a task for their study which tested participants’ ability to 
understand hints. The Hinting task comprised ten short passages that each presented an 
interaction between two characters, which ended with one of the characters dropping an 
obvious hint. Participants were asked what the character meant, and were given a 
second, more obvious hint if they did not answer appropriately. The task was read aloud 
and repeated if necessary. Corcoran et al. (1995) found that subgroups of patients with 
negative or paranoid symptoms had difficulties with this task, while those with passivity 
symptoms or in remission performed at the same level as healthy controls, in line with 
Frith’s (1992) theory.
Grieg et al. (2004) found that performance on the Hinting task was correlated with 
thought disorder as measured by the SAPS and PANSS. They also reported a significant 
correlation between ToM performance and the PANSS delusion item, although no 
correlation was found between ToM performance and the SAPS persecutory delusion 
item. These findings provide only partial support for Frith’s model. However, 
difficulties with grouping participants according to high scores on items of these 
instruments have been discussed above.
Marjoram et al. (2005) used the Hinting task and added ten further hinting items that 
they had designed for their study. They compared performance of participants with 
schizophrenia, affective disorder and healthy controls, and found that the group with 
schizophrenia performed worse than the other two groups and that performance was
39
more specifically related to positive symptoms, as measured by the Krawiecka scale of 
psychotic symptoms (Krawiecka, Goldberg & Vaughan, 1977), rather than negative 
symptoms. However, the authors stated that their study “did not have a particular 
subgroup of schizophrenia patients with the particular diagnosis of negative features” 
and that this could account for their lack of findings for negative symptoms. Also, they 
did not differentiate between types of delusions, instead grouping together persecutory 
and other delusions and hallucinations into one ‘positive symptoms’ group.
Walston et al. (2000) used half of the items from the Hinting task in their case studies of 
people with ‘pure’ persecutory delusions, along with a variety of other ToM tasks. Their 
four participants performed the Hinting task perfectly, which is in direct contradiction to 
the results obtained by Corcoran et al. (1995) for participants with paranoid symptoms. 
Although this result is interesting, as it deals exclusively with cases of persecutory 
delusion with no other symptomatology, the authors acknowledged that their case 
studies were not a representative sample, and therefore predictions that all patients with 
persecutory delusions would have unimpaired ToM could not be made.
In summary, the studies that used the Hinting task and looked at differences between 
symptom subtypes found partial support for Frith’s model, showing that individuals with 
negative behavioural signs and paranoid delusions or ‘positive symptoms’ scored poorly 
in different studies.
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6.2.1.2 Studies that did not investigate symptom-based subgroups 
Janssen et al. (2003) used the Hinting task to compare ToM abilities of individuals with 
schizophrenia with those of their relatives. They found that participants with 
schizophrenia were impaired on the Hinting task, as were their relatives (although to a 
lesser degree). They also administered a false belief task but were unable to show a 
statistically significant association between schizophrenia risk and ability on this task, 
suggesting that the Hinting task was a more discriminating measure. Corcoran and Frith 
(2003) used the Hinting task in their investigation into the possible link between ToM 
ability and autobiographical memory impairments. They also administered other ToM 
tasks in the form of stories containing false belief and deception. They found that their 
participants with schizophrenia were impaired on all tasks, and that there was a 
significant correlation between scores on the Hinting task and on the ToM stories. 
Interestingly, they proposed in their paper that there was a possible link between poor 
ability on ToM tasks and poor autobiographical memory performance. They proposed 
that poor recall of autobiographical memories prevented their sample from using 
memories to aid their solving of social inference problems. Corcoran (2003) compared 
performance of individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls on the Hinting task, 
and on an inductive reasoning task. She found a correlation between these tasks in 
patients with schizophrenia but not in the healthy control sample. She concluded that 
people with schizophrenia used a different strategy to those without schizophrenia to 
infer meaning behind pragmatic language, and hypothesised that this difference may 
underlie poor performance on other social inference tasks.
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6.2.2 Gricean Maxims
6.2.2.1 Studies that investigated symptom-based subgroups
One study compared the effects of schizophrenic symptoms on a task involving Gricean 
maxims (Corcoran & Frith, 1996). Corcoran and Frith (1996) administered their 
‘Maxims test’, which tested adherence to the maxims of quantity, quality, relation (i.e. 
be relevant- make sure your contributions relate to the exchange) and manner (i.e. avoid 
being obscure and ambiguous: be brief and orderly) by asking participants to choose the 
correct one of two pieces of speech which would be most appropriate to end a story. 
They also tested politeness using the same format. They found that patients with 
negative symptoms tended to flout all of the maxims apart from the maxim of relation, 
which was adhered to by all groups. Paranoid patients performed at the same level as 
healthy controls on the maxims, but not on the test of politeness, on which they 
performed poorly. Corcoran and Frith (1996) used these results to further interpret the 
results of their earlier study (Frith & Corcoran, 1996). As detailed above, in this study 
groups of patients with behavioural signs and paranoid symptoms had difficulties with 
the Hinting task. Corcoran and Frith (1996) concluded that these two groups had 
difficulties for different reasons. Those with behavioural signs were ignorant of the 
conversational rules that were flouted when hinting, while those with paranoid 
symptoms had difficulties interpreting situations that required on-line mentalising. The 
results of this study, therefore, were broadly in line with Frith’s theory.
6.2.2.2 Studies that did not investigate symptom-based subgroups
Tenyi et al. (2002) compared the performance of participants with schizophrenia and 
healthy controls on a test that specifically looked at the maxim of relation. They did not
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group their sample according to symptoms, and found that their participants with 
schizophrenia performed at a significantly poorer level than controls. This result is 
contrary to Corcoran and Frith’s (1996) results with this maxim, and could be accounted 
for because in Tenyi et al. (2002), participants were forced to generate a response for 
themselves, while in Corcoran and Frith (1996) participants were asked to choose 
between two answers that were provided for them. Therefore, Tenyi et al.’s (2002) task 
may have required the use of “on-line” processing and could therefore have been more 
able to discriminate between individuals with schizophrenia and controls.
6.2,3 Proverbs
6.2.3.1 Studies that did not investigate symptom-based subgroups 
Only two studies reviewed here used tests involving the understanding of proverbs, and 
one of these (Grieg et al., 2004) used Gorham’s Proverb Test (Gorham, 1951) as a 
measure of thought disorder, rather than as a measure of ToM ability. However, Briine 
and Bodenstein (2005) investigated whether scores on a ToM cartoon picture- 
sequencing task were correlated with scores on a task involving the understanding of 
proverbs. They found that patients with schizophrenia chose the correct answer less 
frequently than healthy controls on the proverbs task, and that ToM scores predicted 
scores on the proverbs tasks with a high level of statistical significance. Again, they did 
not investigate differences according to symptoms.
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6.2.4 Metaphor and Irony
6.2.4.1 Studies that investigated symptom-based subgroups 
Mitchley et al. (1998) compared the performance of a group of individuals with 
schizophrenia and a group of psychiatric controls on a task assessing comprehension of 
irony. The task involved choosing the most appropriate of three possible answers to 
short pieces of text. They found that the group with schizophrenia was impaired on the 
task compared to controls, and that negative symptoms were associated with this deficit 
while positive symptoms were not. They reached this conclusion because scores on the 
irony task correlated with the negative scale of the PANSS but not the positive scale. 
However, as discussed above, this methodology does not account for individual 
differences between participants which could bias the results. Langdon et al. (2002b) 
used a computer-based understanding of irony and metaphor task. In this task, short 
stories were presented on a computer screen, culminating in one of the characters 
making a short statement. Participants were asked to judge whether it made sense for the 
character to make the statement by pressing ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In this study, Langdon et al. 
(2002b) found that poor appreciation of irony was associated with high rates of positive 
formal thought disorder (on the SAPS), while poor appreciation of metaphor was 
associated with high rates of negative formal thought disorder (on the SANS). They 
concluded from these results that separate processes were involved in the understanding 
of metaphor and irony, a result that they found in an earlier study (Langdon et al.,
2002a) reported below. The results of these studies were, therefore, in line with Frith’s
(1992) model, with negative symptoms and positive formal thought disorder both being 
found to be associated with deficits on the tasks.
44
6.2.4.2 Studies that did not investigate symptom-based subgroups 
Drury et al. (1998) administered false belief tasks, and a task that involved the 
understanding of a character’s knowledge, as well as a task involving the identification 
of synonyms, similes and metaphors and a task involving the interpretation of metaphor 
and irony. They asked patients with schizophrenia to complete these tasks during the 
acute phase of their illness, and then following recovery. They found very mixed results, 
with individuals with schizophrenia performing as well as controls on the irony task, but 
not performing as well on either of the metaphor tasks, or some of the false belief tasks. 
Interestingly, all of the between-group differences disappeared following recovery. 
Langdon et al. (2002a) used the computer-based task described above in Langdon et al. 
(2002b). They also administered a picture-sequencing task involving false belief, social- 
script, mechanical and ‘capture’ sequences. The findings from their study led them to 
conclude that distinct cognitive processes are involved in the interpretation of metaphor 
and irony and that both of these processes are impaired in people with schizophrenia. 
They further concluded that the interpretation of irony was a task that required a higher 
level of theory of mind skill than metaphor, a view that corresponds with that of Happe
(1993). Herold et al. (2002) also found some discrimination between metaphor and irony 
in their study of the performance of patients with schizophrenia in remission compared 
with a non-psychiatric control group. They presented participants with first and second 
order ToM stories, and metaphor and irony tasks adapted from the study by Drury et al.
(1998). Their sample of participants with schizophrenia in remission performed more 
poorly than controls on the irony tasks only, suggesting that irony tasks may be a more 
stringent test of ToM skills than other tasks.
45
6.3 Summary
Of the fourteen studies reviewed here that investigated ToM deficits in schizophrenia 
using tasks involving indirect speech, seven reported results based on the subgrouping of 
participants according to their presenting symptoms, and seven did not. The seven that 
did not, generally reported that samples with schizophrenia performed worse than 
controls on these tests. Several studies also showed that tasks assessing indirect speech 
comprehension were correlated with other ToM tasks (e.g. Corcoran and Frith, 2003) 
suggesting that the same cognitive skills were being used by participants in both types of 
task. Of the seven studies that looked at symptom-based subgroups, one (Walston et al. 
2000) was a case study design, and one (Marjoram et al., 2005) did not recruit a 
subgroup with negative features. Of the remaining 5 studies, 2 grouped symptoms in a 
hierarchical way (Corcoran et al., 1995; Corcoran and Frith, 1996), and 3 used different 
combinations of PANSS, SAPS and SANS scores (Grieg et al., 2004; Mitchley et al., 
1998; Langdon et al., 2002b). Partial support for Frith’s theory was found in these 
studies, with poor performance on tasks reported for those with positive and negative 
behavioural signs, as well as those with paranoid symptoms.
Taken as a whole, it does seem as if the interpretation of indirect speech can be 
discriminating as a measure of ToM deficits. However, the studies reported in this 
section did suffer from the same methodological difficulties discussed previously. One 
recent development in research in this area has been the harnessing of the schizotypy 
paradigm to recruit non-clinical samples in order to avoid some of these difficulties. The 
schizotypy paradigm will be discussed in the following section.
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7. The Schizotypy paradigm
7.1 Background
The concept of schizotypy has been developed from observations that schizophrenic 
symptomatology exists in milder forms within non-clinical populations. For example, 
studies have demonstrated that psychosis-like symptoms such as magical ideation and 
hallucinations are reported by large proportions of the general population (e.g. 28.4%, 
Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson & Kessler, 1996; 20.1%, Poulton et al., 2000). The 
widespread use of scales of schizotypy in non-clinical samples has left little doubt that 
psychotic-like features are represented among the general population (Claridge and 
Beech, 1995).
However, there is debate as to whether schizotypy should be conceptualised as 
categorical or dimensional, in other words whether or not a continuum exists from low 
schizotypy at one end through to full-blown psychosis at the other. For example, Meehl 
(1962) did not see any connection between schizophrenia and schizotypy as a 
personality continuum, whereas Eysenck (1960) viewed psychiatric disorders, including 
the psychoses, merely as representing the end-points of continuously variable 
dimensions. More recently, writers such as Lenzenweger (1993) have tended to define a 
dichotomous, categorical approach to schizotypy, while Claridge and Beech (1995) have 
taken a view of schizotypy as a continuous trait across the population.
In a recent paper, Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam and van Os (2003) reviewed studies 
published between 2000 and 2002 that related to the continuity hypothesis of psychosis. 
In their review, the authors concluded that there is credible evidence in support of the
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suggestion that schizotypal and psychotic experiences lie on a continuum. They found 
evidence that psychosis-like experiences and psychotic disorder were related to the same 
demographic, personality, environmental, genetic, neuro-cognitive and psycho- 
physiological risk factors.
7.2 Measuring schizotypy
Many scales have been developed to measure schizotypy, for example Raine’s (1991) 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, the Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA) of 
Claridge and Broks (1984), or the Psychoticism Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975).
These questionnaires differ depending on whether they take schizotypy to be a broad 
construct reflecting the symptoms of Schizotypal Personality Disorder or assume that it 
is a narrower, more limited concept. There have been a number of attempts to establish 
the underlying structure of schizotypy, usually by factor analysis. According to Mason 
and Claridge (2006), a consensus has been reached that schizotypy reduces to three 
factors- positive schizotypy, negative schizotypy and cognitive disorganisation- that 
correspond to the three-factor model of schizophrenia (e.g. Liddle, 1987). However, 
Mason and Claridge (2006) argued that this is too narrow a view of schizotypy, and that 
a broader concept would more accurately reflect the clinical observation that 
schizophrenia and affective disorders may share a common biological susceptibility (for 
more details see Claridge, 1997; Mason and Claridge, 2006). This provides the 
theoretical framework for the development of their measure of schizotypy, the Oxford- 
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE: Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 
1995), which was based on the largest study of schizotypal traits undertaken, in which 
Claridge et al. (1996) used factor analysis to investigate the answers of over 1000
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participants to a battery of fifteen psychosis-proneness scales. The O-LIFE has four 
scales, Unusual Experiences (UnEx), Introvertive Anhedonia (IntAn), Cognitive 
Disorganisation (CogDis), and Impulsive Nonconformity (ImpNon). The first three 
scales map neatly onto the three factors listed above, with Impulsive Nonconformity as 
their fourth scale. A full elucidation of the debate concerning the inclusion of this fourth 
scale is beyond the scope of this paper. However, Mason and Claridge (2006) argued 
that recent evidence supports their viewpoint, citing a study that reported that 
questionnaire measures of schizotypy have lacked specificity in distinguishing 
schizophrenia from bipolar disorder (Heron et al., 2003), and their own work in the 
development of the scale. Further, various studies have demonstrated that high 
schizotypy scorers identified using the O-LIFE, demonstrate the same neuro-cognitive 
deficits as schizophrenic patients (e.g. Burch, Steel & Hemsley, 1998; Goodarzi, Wykes 
& Hemsley, 2000; Rawlings & Goldberg, 2001).
7.3 Schizotypy research
Whether a three- or four-factor solution is adhered to, the findings reported above 
suggest that models of neuropsychological function in schizophrenia may be 
investigated by administering tasks to non-clinical samples which vary in schizotypy 
(Pickup, 2006). Indeed many studies have done so, investigating, for example, sustained 
attention (Rawlings & Goldberg, 2001), visuo-spatial processing (Tsakanikos & Reed, 
2003) and latent inhibition (Gray, Fernandez, Williams, Ruddle & Snowden, 2002). The 
advantages of such a strategy are that participants are free from a history of mental 
health difficulties, which creates many possible confounding effects such as the use of
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neuroleptic medication, potential de-socialisation due to prolonged hospital admissions, 
and lack of attention and concentration when carrying out research tasks.
Recently, several researchers have begun to test ToM in non-clinical populations using a 
schizotypy paradigm.
7,4 Schizotypy and theory of mind
To date, three studies have investigated the relationship between schizotypy and ToM: 
Langdon and Coltheart (1999; 2004) and Pickup (2006). As with analogous studies with 
individuals with schizophrenia, these studies all investigated Frith’s (1992) model of the 
disorder.
Langdon and Coltheart (1999) were the first researchers to study ToM using the 
schizotypy paradigm. In their 1999 paper, they published the results of two separate 
experiments. In their first experiment, they tested ToM ability with a picture-sequencing 
task, where participants were asked to sequence three different types of stories. 
‘Mechanical’ stories depicted sequences of physical cause and effect and tested the 
ability to infer causal relations. ‘Social-script’ stories depicted people carrying out 
everyday social routines and tested ability to reason logically using social-script 
knowledge. ‘False belief stories featured a character who acted on the basis of 
information that participants knew to be false. Langdon and Coltheart assessed 
schizotypy using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: Raine, 1991) before 
administering the picture-sequencing task. For analysis, participants were split into high 
and low schizotypy groups using a median split of their total SPQ scores.
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The results of this study showed that, as predicted by Frith’s (1992) theory, high 
schizotypy participants performed more poorly on the false belief stories than those with 
low schizotypy, but not on the social-script or mechanical stories. Further, Langdon and 
Coltheart divided their group into good and poor mentalisers and, using the terminology 
of Raine et al. (1994), found that those who were rated as poor mentalisers were 
significantly more likely to report a higher level of interpersonal schizotypal traits than 
good mentalisers, and that there was a non-significant trend for them to report more 
cognitive-perceptual traits. ‘Interpersonal’ traits in this terminology are equivalent to 
those traits picked up by the Introvertive Anhedonia scale of the O-LIFE (i.e. negative 
schizotypy), and ‘cognitive-perceptual’ traits are those picked up by the Unusual 
Experiences scale of the O-LIFE (i.e. positive schizotypy).
Langdon and Coltheart (1999) concluded that this finding was at odds with Frith’s 
theory because, they argued, if psychotic-like symptoms were related to ToM deficits 
then poor mentalisers should report significantly more ‘cognitive-perceptual’ traits, 
which relate directly to psychotic-like experiences. However, Frith’s theory states that 
negative behavioural signs lead to the most widespread ToM deficits, while paranoid 
symptoms lead to less widespread ToM deficits. Therefore, as negative signs correspond 
to ‘interpersonal’ traits and paranoid symptoms to only some of the items on the 
‘cognitive-perceptual’ scale, Langdon and Coltheart’s (1999) results do seem to fit with 
Frith’s theory.
In their second experiment, Langdon and Coltheart (1999) included a fourth picture- 
sequencing task, consisting of ‘capture’ stories, which depicted a highly salient cue to
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mislead participants to sequence the story incorrectly if they relied on that cue. Langdon 
and Coltheart included this sequence type because they theorised that it was harder than 
the ToM stories and therefore could control for ceiling effects. They also included the 
Tower of London task to control for executive function. Their results showed that there 
were no differences between high and low schizotypes, as measured by the SPQ, on the 
mechanical, social script and capture stories, but high schizotypes again performed 
significantly more badly on the false belief stories. Further, in this experiment, poor 
mentalisers were significantly more likely to rate cognitive-perceptual items (analogous 
to the O-LIFE UnEx scale) and disorganised items (analogous to O-LIFE CogDis) but 
did not differ significantly from good mentalisers when rating interpersonal items 
(analogous to O-LIFE IntAn). This profile differed from that in experiment one, and was 
considered by the authors to be more in line with Frith’s (1992) predictions.
Following their 1999 paper, Langdon and Coltheart published another paper in 2004 
with a non-clinical sample. In this study they investigated the effect of schizotypy on the 
ability to recognise metaphor and irony, following up research that had found that 
metaphor and irony comprehension is impaired in patients with schizophrenia (Langdon 
et al., 2002b, described above). In their 2002 study, they found that poor appreciation of 
irony was associated with high rates of positive formal thought disorder in patients, 
while poor appreciation of metaphor was associated with high rates of negative formal 
thought disorder. Langdon et al (2002b) concluded that difficulties with irony could be 
accounted for by ToM deficits, but difficulties with metaphor were unrelated to ToM, 
and appeared to be related to abnormal semantics in schizophrenia. In their schizotypy
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study, Langdon and Coltheart (2004) hypothesised that non-clinical participants would 
show a similar profile to those with schizophrenia.
In their 2004 study, Langdon and Coltheart recruited 36 university students, who 
completed the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. They also carried out the same 
computerised task administered in Langdon et al. (2002a; 2002b), described above. The 
results of the study showed that the high schizotypal participants had significantly 
greater difficulty interpreting the ironical statements than those with low schizotypy. 
Correlation analyses revealed that positive schizotypal traits, in particular cognitive- 
perceptual traits (i.e. traits measured by the UnEx scale of O-LIFE), may have been 
more strongly associated with a lack of understanding of irony than metaphor, although 
this result was compromised by the small sample size. This finding was again in line 
with the predictions of Frith’s (1992) model. This study did not, however, include 
another measure of ToM, for example a false belief stories task, in order to investigate 
whether scores on the understanding of irony and ToM tasks correlate in a non-clinical 
sample. It would also be useful to replicate these findings with a larger sample.
The third study looking at ToM and schizotypy was carried out by Pickup (2006).
Pickup used a story task that had been developed for use with non-clinical adults in 
order to assess ToM through requiring participants to make inferences about the mental 
states of story characters. The task comprised 16 short stories, each followed by a test 
question. Eight of the stories were described as ‘physical’ stories and required reasoning 
about situations in which people were involved, but required no mental state attribution. 
The other 8 stories (testing ToM) involved double bluff, mistakes, persuasions and white
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lies, and were followed by a question involving an inference about a character’s 
thoughts or feelings. Pickup recruited 62 participants and administered the stories task, 
as well as the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) to 
measure schizotypy, and tests of IQ and executive function.
Unlike the previous studies using the schizotypy paradigm, Pickup divided his sample 
into subgroups according to schizotypy traits that were analogous to the schizophrenic 
symptoms groupings of Frith’s model. The ‘behavioural signs’ group was made up of 
those who had scored highly on the Introvertive Anhedonia, Cognitive Disorganisation 
and Impulsive Non-conformity sub-scales. Of the remaining participants, those who had 
scored highly on the Unusual Experiences subscale made up the ‘positive symptoms’ 
group, and any participants who had not been classified were allocated to a ‘no 
symptom’ group.
The results of this study showed no association between total schizotypy score and 
performance on the ToM stories. However, higher scores on the Unusual Experiences 
scale, which corresponded to positive symptoms, were associated with poorer ToM story 
task performance (and intact performance on the ‘physical’ stories).
Inclusion in the behavioural signs subgroup which, according to Frith’s model, would 
have been expected to perform more poorly than the positive symptoms subgroup, was 
not found to be associated with ToM task scores. Pickup hypothesised that this could 
have been due to the use of the O-LIFE rather than the SPQ, the scale used by Langdon 
and Coltheart (1999; 2004). He noted that the SPQ is weighted in favour of items that
correspond to the Unusual Experiences subscale of the O-LIFE, and so the association 
found by Langdon et al. (2004) may in fact be the association that Pickup found between 
Unusual Experiences and ToM ability. He further theorised that his design may have 
contributed to the lack of an association between the behavioural signs subgroup and 
ToM score. In his design he allowed participants to re-read the stories as many times as 
they needed, which could have prevented them from having to use their “on-line” 
mentalising ability.
7.5 Summary
This section summarised the recent developments in the use of the schizotypy paradigm 
to investigate various aspects of neuropsychological functioning in schizophrenia, in 
particular in ToM. The theoretical basis of the concept of schizotypy was reported, 
followed by discussion of its measurement, before the results of the only three studies 
published to date investigating ToM deficits in a non-clinical sample using the 
schizotypy paradigm. These studies provided partial evidence for Frith’s model, with 
individuals scoring high in schizotypy reliably performing poorly on ToM tasks in all 
the studies. Scales corresponding to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia were also 
associated with ToM deficits, and in some studies poor mentalisers were significantly 
more likely to endorse items on scales corresponding to negative signs. More research is 
needed in this area in order to investigate further the application of this paradigm to 
ToM.
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8. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the evidence for a ToM deficit in schizophrenia, and found that 
very strong evidence for such a deficit exists. The main aim of the paper, however, was 
to assess the evidence for ToM impairments in schizophrenia that would lend weight to 
Frith’s (1992) theory, which predicts that specific schizophrenic symptoms will be 
associated with differing degrees of ToM impairment. This review has found partial 
evidence for Frith’s (1992) theory, with many published studies providing conflicting 
findings. That such differing results have been found can be attributed to methodological 
differences in grouping participants according to symptomatology, difficulties with the 
use of a proliferation of differing ToM tasks, and the inherent consequences of carrying 
out research with an extremely heterogeneous, mentally unwell population.
More recently, three studies were published that attempted to solve this latter problem 
by investigating ToM in individuals who vary in schizotypy. These studies again 
provided partial support for Frith’s (1992) model, which may have been due to the use 
of different measures of ToM ability and schizotypy, as well as different ways of 
grouping their participants according to schizotypal traits. Further investigation with 
non-clinical samples is needed. In particular, investigations using tasks that aim to tap 
into “on-line” processing skills of participants would be useful, as well as tasks that are 
sensitive to subtle differences in ToM abilities.
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Part 2: Empirical paper
1. Abstract
Following Frith’s (1992) suggestion that many of the symptoms of schizophrenia are 
associated with theory of mind (ToM) impairments, several studies have found 
associations in non-clinical samples between poorer performance on ToM tasks and 
schizotypal traits (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999; Langdon & Coltheart, 2004; Pickup, 
2006). This study aims to replicate and extend these findings.
Seventy-two healthy individuals were recruited and completed a schizotypy 
questionnaire (the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), 
as well as ToM stories task and understanding of irony stories task. Executive function 
was assessed using the Brixton test, and full-scale IQ was predicted using the WTAR. 
Schizotypal traits analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia predicted 
performance on the irony task, while IQ predicted performance on the other ToM task. 
There was no association between schizotypal traits analogous to “behavioural signs” of 
schizophrenia and performance on either task.
This study concluded that positive schizotypal traits in healthy individuals are associated 
with ToM impairments, independent of executive function or IQ. The association 
between “behavioural signs” and poor ToM may only occur in patients with 
schizophrenia. Reasons for these findings are discussed in light of Frith’s model.
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2. Introduction
2.1 Frith’s cognitive neuropsychological model
Frith’s (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia suggested that the 
symptoms of schizophrenia could be accounted for in terms of impairments in Theory of 
Mind (ToM), the ability to represent one’s own and others’ mental states. Difficulty with 
the representation of others’ mental states is widely accepted as underlying the so-called 
triad of impairments in Autistic Spectrum Disorder (Wing, 1979), and many studies 
have investigated the performance of individuals with schizophrenia on ToM tasks since 
Frith’s (1992) theory was first developed (for detailed reviews, see Briine, 2005; 
Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005).
Frith’s (1992) model made clear predictions concerning the performance of individuals 
with schizophrenia on ToM tasks. These predictions were based on the way that Frith 
classified schizophrenic symptomatology. Within his theoretical framework, a 
distinction was made between the bizarre experiences and beliefs that a person with 
schizophrenia can describe (‘symptoms’) and the behavioural abnormalities that can be 
observed (‘signs’). Using this classification, Frith (1992) postulated a hierarchy of 
impairments on ToM tasks. First, individuals with negative (e.g. flat affect, social 
withdrawal) or positive (e.g. incoherent speech) behavioural signs should score very 
poorly on the tasks, scoring similarly to those with autism, because the model states that 
these people are unable to represent any mental states. Secondly, those with paranoid 
symptoms (e.g. persecutory delusions) but no behavioural signs should be less impaired 
than those with behavioural signs but more impaired than controls, because these people 
were theorised to be able to represent mental states but to make errors while doing so.
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Finally, people with passivity symptoms (e.g. thought insertion) and those in remission 
should score at the same level as controls, as they were presumed to have no ToM 
deficit.
2.2 Evidence for the model
Investigations of ToM ability in schizophrenia have shown conclusively that patients 
show impaired performance on ToM tasks when compared to healthy and psychiatric 
controls. Individuals with positive behavioural signs have performed consistently poorly 
across studies (Doody, Gotz, Johnstone, Frith & Cunningham Owens, 1998; Grieg, 
Bryson & Bell, 2004; Sarfati and Hardy-Bayle, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche & 
Widlocher, 1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet & Widlocher, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy- 
Bayle, Nadel, Chevalier & Widlocher, 1997) as have those with negative behavioural 
signs (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997; Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Frith and 
Corcoran, 1996). The picture for individuals with paranoid symptoms is more mixed. 
Several studies (Corcoran et al., 1995; 1997; Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Frith & Corcoran, 
1996; Marjoram et al., 2005; Pickup & Frith, 2001) have shown that patients with 
paranoia or persecutory delusions do show ToM deficits, while others have been unable 
to show such a link (Grieg et al., 2004; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts, 2001; Mazza, 
De Risio, Surian, Roncone & Casacchia, 2001; Walston, Blennerhassett & Charlton,
2000). Studies that investigated patients in remission have found a similarly mixed 
picture. While several showed no difference between a remitted group and controls 
(Corcoran et al., 1995; 1997; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) one study showed that patients in 
remission performed at the same level as symptomatic patients on ToM tasks (Randall, 
Corcoran, Day & Bentall, 2003).
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These mixed findings should be considered in the light of several limitations that make 
generalising across studies difficult. Firstly, a wide range of tasks has been used to test 
ToM performance, including verbal and non-verbal tasks, tasks that involve false belief 
or deception, jokes or the understanding of non-literal speech. It is not clear that these 
tasks all measure the same underlying construct, especially as their psychometric 
properties have not been firmly established in any of the studies that employed them 
(Harrington et al., 2005). Secondly, the studies have used different methods of grouping 
their participants. Because Frith’s theory made specific predictions based on different 
symptoms, it is important that studies ensure that each subgroup of participants does not 
contain individuals whose symptoms belong to a different subgroup. Because of the 
heterogeneity of symptoms within individuals with schizophrenia, this is very difficult to 
achieve. The third group of limitations represents the difficulties inherent in carrying out 
research with a psychiatrically unwell population. These include small sample sizes, the 
effects of medication and hospitalisation, and difficulties with concentration and 
attention.
2.3 Schizotypy
Several studies have used the schizotypy paradigm in order to minimise the 
experimental difficulties associated with investigations of individuals with 
schizophrenia. The sub-clinical expression of schizophrenic symptoms in the normal 
population has been variously termed schizotypy, psychoticism, or psychosis-proneness 
(Claridge, 1994).
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Schizotypal traits can be measured in the normal population using self-report 
questionnaires such as the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O- 
LIFE: Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995), which was developed through factor analysis 
of a variety of schizotypy scales, and focuses on four dimensions of schizotypy. Three of 
these map onto Liddle’s (1987) three-factor model of schizophrenia: a positive factor 
(Unusual Experiences, UE), a negative factor (Introvertive Anhedonia, IA), and a 
disorganisation factor (Cognitive Disorganisation, CD). The fourth dimension,
Impulsive Nonconformity, IN, was largely based on Eysenck’s Psychoticism scale 
(Tsakanikos & Reed, 2003).
Individuals high in schizotypy have been found to resemble individuals with 
schizophrenia in various aspects of neuropsychological functioning, for example 
sustained attention (Rawlings & Goldberg, 2001), visuo-spatial processing (Tsakanikos 
& Reed, 2003) and latent inhibition (Gray, Fernandez, Williams, Ruddle & Snowden, 
2002). These findings have added weight to the premise that the schizotypy paradigm 
can be thought of experimentally as analogous to schizophrenia.
2.4 Schizotypy and theory of mind
To date, three studies have investigated the relationship between schizotypy and theory 
of mind in order to test Frith’s (1992) model. Langdon and Coltheart (1999) published 
the results of two separate experiments. They tested ToM ability with a picture- 
sequencing task and assessed schizotypy using the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (SPQ: Raine, 1991). For analysis, participants were split into groups of 
high and low schizotypy using a median split of their total SPQ scores. The results of
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these studies showed that, as predicted by Frith’s (1992) theory, high schizotypy 
participants performed more poorly on the ToM task than those with low schizotypy. 
They also divided their samples into good and poor ‘mentalisers’. In their first 
experiment poor mentalising was significantly associated with schizotypal traits 
analogous to negative signs of schizophrenia and in their second experiment poor 
mentalising was significantly associated with traits analogous to positive symptoms.
Langdon and Coltheart (2004) investigated the effect of schizotypy on the ability to 
recognise metaphor and irony, following up previous research that found that metaphor 
and irony comprehension was impaired in patients with schizophrenia, and that the 
impairment on irony tasks was associated with poor performance on conventional ToM 
tasks (Langdon, Davies & Coltheart, 2002). Their participants again completed the SPQ 
and carried out a computerised task that tested their understanding of metaphor and 
irony. The results showed that high schizotypal participants had significantly greater 
difficulty interpreting the ironical statements than those with low schizotypy, in line with 
the predictions of Frith’s (1992) model. Unlike Langdon et al.’s (2002) study with 
individuals with schizophrenia, this study did not include another measure of ToM, for 
example a false belief stories task, in order to investigate whether scores on the 
understanding of irony task and false belief task were correlated in a non-clinical 
sample.
The third study looking at theory of mind and schizotypy was carried out by Pickup 
(2006). This study used a story task that had been developed for use with healthy adults 
in order to assess ToM through requiring participants to make inferences about the
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mental states of story characters. Pickup (2006) also administered the O-LIFE (Mason et 
al., 1995) to measure schizotypy, as well as tests of IQ and executive function. The 
sample was divided into sub-groups according to schizotypy traits that were analogous 
to the schizophrenic symptom groupings of Frith’s (1992) model. The results of this 
study showed that higher scores on the Unusual Experiences scale of the O-LIFE, which 
corresponded to positive symptoms, were associated with poorer ToM story task 
performance, while there was no association between total schizotypy score and 
performance on the ToM stories. Pickup (2006) hypothesised that his lack of findings 
for total schizotypy could have been due to the use of the O-LIFE rather than the SPQ. 
He found that inclusion in the behavioural signs subgroup was not found to be 
associated with ToM task scores (contrary to predictions from Frith’s (1992) model), 
and he suggested that this may have been because participants were able to re-read the 
stories as many times as needed, which could have prevented them from having to use 
their “on-line” mentalising ability. “On-line” mentalising refers to that which takes place 
during an interaction, and may utilise different skills from that which would take place at 
an individual’s own pace. It may be that difficulties in mentalising are more apparent 
when the pace of mentalising is dictated by the interaction, rather than individuals 
allowing themselves more time, for example to re-read tasks. The mode of presentation 
of tasks, therefore, may give rise to greater or lesser discrimination between individuals’ 
ToM ability.
In summary, the findings from studies investigating ToM ability and schizotypy have 
produced similarly inconsistent findings to those that investigated ToM ability in 
schizophrenic populations. Schizotypal traits analogous to both negative signs and
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positive symptoms have been found to be associated with ToM deficits in different 
studies, and task presentation has been hypothesised to affect ToM ability. Only Pickup 
(2006) divided his participants into groups based on Frith’s classification.
2.5 The present study
This study aims to further investigate the link between ToM ability and schizotypy. 
Specifically, the study will administer the O-LIFE and the ToM story task administered 
by Pickup (2006) in order to replicate his findings. An irony task taken from Mitchley et 
al. (1998) (in which it was administered to individuals with schizophrenia) will also be 
used with the aim of replicating Langdon et al.’s (2004) finding of an association 
between schizotypy and irony comprehension. This will also allow investigation of 
whether the correlation between scores on ToM tasks and irony tasks, found in Langdon 
et al. (2002) in individuals with schizophrenia, can be found in a non-clinical sample. In 
addition, the study aims to investigate whether the presentation of tasks in such a way 
that maximises “on-line” ToM processing will allow the detection of associations 
between ToM and all the dimensions of schizotypy as predicted by Frith’s (1992) model. 
It will be important to control for IQ in this study because, as Pickup and Frith (2001) 
reported, deficits in ToM ability may be compensated for by IQ-dependent problem­
solving skills. Furthermore, patients with schizophrenia can show deficits in executive 
functioning (e.g. Hutton et al., 1998), which has also been shown to vary with 
schizotypy (e.g. Raine, Sheard, Reynolds, & Lencz, 1992), and therefore will be 
controlled for in the present study.
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It is predicted that an association will be found between poorer performance on the ToM 
stories task and higher schizotypy scores, and between poorer irony task performance 
and higher schizotypy scores. Secondly, in line with Frith’s (1992) theory, it is predicted 
that impairments on the ToM stories and irony tasks will be associated with schizotypal 
traits analogous to behavioural signs, and, to a lesser extent, schizotypal traits analogous 
to positive symptoms, while individuals low in schizotypy are hypothesised to perform 
at normal levels on both tasks. Finally, a correlation is predicted between ToM story task 
scores and irony task scores.
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3. Methods
3.1 Design
This study used a cross-sectional correlational design to investigate the relationship 
between schizotypy and performance on ToM tasks.
3.2 Participants
In estimating the number of participants required, Cohen’s (1992) formula was used. 
This formula is: f2 = R2 /1 - R2, where f2 is the effect size index and R2 is the size of the 
correlation. In his investigation of the relationship between ToM score and schizotypy, 
Pickup (2006) found a significant value of R2 = 0.122 in a multiple regression, and this 
figure was used to calculate the sample size of the present study. Therefore, to estimate 
effect size, the following calculation was undertaken in line with Cohen’s (1992) 
formula: 0.122 / (1-0.122) = 0.14. This corresponded to a medium effect size (0.15). 
With a medium effect size, Cohen’s table of sample sizes, given a 0.05 significance 
level, gives an N  of 76. Therefore the sample size that this study aimed to recruit was 
approximately 76.
Seventy-two participants were recruited by sampling a student population. Inclusion 
criteria were English as first language, an age between 18 and 50 and no history of 
psychiatric illness or head injury. As in Pickup (2006), the Schizotypal Personality Scale 
(STA) of the Claridge and Broks (1984) Schizotypy Questionnaire (STQ) was used to 
screen participants to ensure that the sample represented a broad range of schizotypy 
(see appendix 2). Following Pickup (2006), participants were classified as “average” 
schizotypes if they scored within one standard deviation (SD) of the population mean on
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the STA, “low” schizotypes if they scored more than 1 SD below the population mean 
and “high” schizotypes if they scored more than 1 SD above the population mean.
In total, 52 females and 20 males participated in the study. Their ages ranged from 19 to 
35 years, mean (SD) = 22.4 (3.5).
Ten participants fell within the “low” range on the STA: 2 male, 8 female; mean (SD) 
age = 24.9 (4.1). Fifty-one participants fell within the “average” range: 12 male, 39 
female; mean (SD) age = 22.0 (3.2). Eleven participants fell within the “high” range: 6 
male, 5 female; mean (SD) age = 21.8 (3.6).
As in Pickup (2006), the Lie Scale of the Short Form of the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) was incorporated into the 
STA. This assessed participants’ tendency to give socially desirable but untruthful 
answers to 12 questions, and was included in order to give an indication of the reliability 
of participants’ answers on the other measures. In Pickup (2006), a score of more than 1 
SD above the population mean on the Lie Scale led to exclusion from the study. 
However, in this study, scores on the Lie Scale were very low, ranging from 0-2 out of 
12, and so no participants were excluded on this basis.
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3.3 Measures
Following screening, participants completed the following measures in the order shown:
3.3.1 The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE)
A self-report measure of schizotypy devised by Mason, Claridge and Jackson (1995), the 
O-LIFE consists of between 24 and 30 questions on each of four scales: “unusual 
experiences” (UE); “cognitive disorganisation” (CD); “impulsive nonconformity” (IN) 
and “introvertive anhedonia” (IA) (see appendix 3). Because schizotypy is known to 
vary with age and sex, raw scores on these scales were standardised using Mason and 
Claridge’s (2006) population norms.
3.3.2 The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR)
The WTAR requires participants to read aloud a list of 50 words which have irregular 
spellings, giving a score out of 50 which represents the number of words correctly 
pronounced. It has a high internal consistency in the range 0.87-0.95 across ages. Also, 
the WTAR has high test-retest reliability (r in range 0.90-0.94) (Wechsler, 2001). 
Because it was developed and co-normed simultaneously with the widely-used WAIS- 
III, the WTAR is a simple and effective method of estimating full-scale IQ. The WTAR 
displays high positive correlations (r in range 0.63-0.80) with full-scale IQ {Wechsler,
2001). Raw scores were converted to an estimate of full-scale IQ using standard 
conversion tables (Wechsler, 2001).
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3.3.3 The Brixton Test
In this short measure of executive function developed by Burgess and Shallice (1997), 
participants are shown a series of pages showing the same basic array of 10 circles, one 
of which is coloured blue. The position of this coloured circle changes from page to 
page according to rules that change several times during the test. The participant is asked 
to predict where the coloured circle will move next. The test is scored through a count of 
the number of errors made, with the raw score of between 0 and 54 errors being 
converted to a scaled score of 1 to 10, with 10 indicating 0-7 errors and being classified 
as “very superior” and 1 indicating over 31 errors and being classified as “impaired”. 
Burgess and Shallice (1997) reported that the Brixton test has a high test-retest reliability 
(r = 0.71), as well as good split-test reliability (r = 0.62), and suggested that this test is 
sensitive to problems in rule detection and tendencies toward impulsive behavior and 
provides a purer measure than related tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtis, 1981). It was included to provide a control for 
executive difficulties with generativity or inhibition.
3.3.4 Theory of mind (ToM) and \physical ’ control stories
The ToM task used in this study (see appendix 4) was adapted from Pickup (2006) to 
facilitate replication. The task comprises 16 short passages, followed in each case by a 
test question. Eight of the stories are used as measures of ToM, involving double bluff, 
mistakes, persuasions and white lies based on Happe’s (1994) ‘Strange Stories’ and 
developed for use with adults by Fletcher et al. (1995). Each is followed by a question 
requiring an inference about a character’s thoughts and feelings. The other 8 stories, the 
‘physical’ stories, were also developed by Fletcher et al. (1995) and require reasoning
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about situations in which people are involved, but do not require the attribution of 
mental states.
As discussed in the previous section, this study aimed to maximise participants’ reliance 
on their “on-line” mentalising ability. With this in mind, in the present study the stories 
were recorded onto compact disc and presented to participants aurally. Participants were 
only able to hear the stories once before answering out loud. It was felt that this method 
of presentation most closely represented conversational interactions in the real world. 
Responses were recorded for later transcription and scoring, using the standard criteria 
detailed in Pickup (2006). Because their responses were recorded, it was also possible to 
measure accurately the time between the end of the test question and the beginning of 
participants’ answers. This time was recorded for later analysis.
The stories were presented randomly and in this respect the present study also differs 
from Pickup (2006), who presented all stories of one type together.
3.3.5 Understanding of irony and literal control stories
The understanding of irony task (see appendix 5) was chosen for its similarity to the 
stories task described above and is based on a task that Mitchley et al. (1998) used with 
individuals with schizophrenia. The task consists of 18 items. In 9 of the items, the 
correct identification of the use of irony is necessary in order to give a correct response, 
while in the other 9 no irony is employed and the statements are designed to be 
interpreted literally. In the original task, each item consisted of a short statement, 
followed by three possible answers, with participants being asked to select the one that
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they felt made most sense. In the present study, the three possible answers were not 
presented to participants, in order to make the format of the task closer to that of the 
ToM and physical stories, where participants were free to respond in any way they 
wished. The irony and literal stories were also recorded onto compact disc for aural 
presentation and were presented randomly intermixed with the ToM and physical 
stories. It was felt important that the stories were as similar as possible to minimise the 
risk of participants recognising story formats.
3.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room, having been given written 
information about the study (see appendix 6) and having had the opportunity to ask 
questions. After giving written, informed consent to take part (see appendix 6), tasks 
were administered in the order listed above. The procedure took between forty minutes 
and one hour to complete, and participants were reimbursed for their time.
3.5 Ethics
The study was approved by the local University College London Research Ethics 
Committee (see appendix 7).
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4. Results
4.1 Questionnaire data
4.1.1 Schizotypy scales
The means, standard deviations (SD) and range of scores for the whole sample on the 
questionnaire measures used are shown in Table 1. Raw O-LIFE scores were converted 
to standard scores for analysis using Mason et al.’s (2006) updated sex and age norms 
(standard score = (raw score -  norm mean score) / SD). The total O-LIFE standard score 
was then the sum of the standard scores for each sub-scale.
Table 1:
Mean (SD) and range o f scores on the questionnaires
Scale Mean (SD) Range
STA 15.49 (6.88) 2-35
O-LIFE: Unusual experiences (UE) 8.94 (6.49) 0-26
O-LIFE: Cognitive disorganisation (CD) 11.22 (5.25) 2-24
O-LIFE: Introvertive anhedonia (IA) 4.54 (3.43) 0-13
O-LIFE: Impulsive nonconformity (IN) 8.99 (3.48) 2-18
O-LIFE: Total score 33.82(13.44) 13-70
The presence of outliers in the questionnaire data was investigated. Participants whose
score on a variable fell more than 3 standard deviations away from the sample mean had
that score excluded from further analysis. In the questionnaire data, one participant’s 
score on the Introvertive Anhedonia subscale was excluded (z = 3.9). No other 
participants’ scores were excluded.
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All of the scores on the questionnaires were normally distributed, so it was not necessary 
to carry out any transformations in order for parametric analyses to be carried out.
4.2 IQ and Brixton test scores
The mean (SD; range) full-scale IQ of the sample as measured by the WTAR was 
115.72 (6.58; 97-127). The mean (SD; range) score on the Brixton test was 7.54 (1.33; 
6- 10).
The presence of outliers was also investigated for these tests. One participant’s Full- 
Scale IQ score was excluded (z = 3.29). Scores on the Brixton test were normally 
distributed, but standard scores on the WTAR were negatively skewed. In order for the 
assumption of normality required for parametric analysis to be fulfilled, the WTAR 
standard scores were reflected and a square root transformation was applied. The 
reflected and transformed scores were normally distributed.
4.2.1 Relationship between schizotypy and executive function
In order to investigate previous findings that high schizotypy is associated with poor 
executive function (e.g. Raine et al., 1992), a correlation analysis was carried out. This 
revealed no association between total O-LIFE scores and scores on the Brixton test: 
Pearson’s r = -0.136; p = 0.253.
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4.2.2 Relationship between schizotypy and IQ
Tsakanikos and Reed (2003) reported that, contrary to the intellectual decline found in 
schizophrenia, they found no association between IQ, as measured in their study using 
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, and O-LIFE scores. In the present study, predicted 
full-scale IQ and total O-LIFE scores were also found to be unrelated (Pearson’s r = 
0.064; p = 0.594).
4.3 The stories tasks
4.3.1 Missing data analysis
A small number of participants missed out one or more of the stories, reporting that they 
did not hear them properly. However, because of the small number of stories missed out 
(less than 5% of the dataset), no participants were excluded from subsequent analysis on 
this basis. Due to the small numbers involved, it was felt that a missing cases analysis 
would have been inappropriate, as there would have been insufficient power to establish 
non-randomness of missing data.
4.3.2 Scores on stories tasks
Participants were awarded a score of 0, 1 or 2 on each of the ToM, physical, irony and 
literal stories, following Happe’s scoring system, also used by Pickup (2006). A score of 
2 was given for a full and explicitly correct answer, and a score of 1 was given for a 
partial or implicit answer. A sub-set of 20 data sets was scored by a second rater, who 
was blind to the study hypotheses, and agreement between the scorers was good (88%).
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Because some participants did not answer some of the stories, it was not possible to use 
total story scores for analysis, and mean scores were used instead.
For the whole sample, the means, SDs and range of mean scores on the four story types 
are given in Table 2.
Table 2:
Whole sample story data
Story type N Mean (SD) Range
ToM 70 1.78 (0.18) 1.38-2.00
Physical 71 1.57(0.27) 0.88-2.00
Irony 69 1.88 (0.15) 1.44-2.00
Literal 71 1.76 (0.27) 1.00-2.00
The presence of outliers was investigated in the story data. One outlier was removed 
from ToM stories and one from the irony stories (z = 3.76 and 3.24 respectively). No 
outliers were found in either the physical or literal stories. Following removal of the 
outliers, the scores were tested for normality.
Mean ToM and physical story scores were both normally distributed. Mean irony and 
literal story scores were significantly negatively skewed so were transformed in order to 
meet the assumptions for normality required for parametric analyses: scores were 
reflected and then a constant, 3, was added to each to ensure that no score fell below 
zero, before their inverse was calculated. This removed the skewness.
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There was a statistically significant difference between the mean scores on the ToM and 
physical stories (within-subjects /-test: t(69) = 6.40; p  < 0.001, 2-tailed) and the irony 
and literal stories (within-subjects /-test: /(68) = 3.19;p  = 0.002, 2-tailed). This showed 
that, contrary to the findings of Fletcher et al. (1995) and Pickup (2006), participants 
found the physical stories more difficult than the ToM stories. Participants also appeared 
to have found the literal stories more difficult than the irony stories.
4.3.3 Correlation between ToM and irony scores
In order to give an indication of whether the ToM stories task and the irony stories task 
were both measuring the same underlying construct, a correlation analysis of scores on 
the two tasks was carried out. This showed that scores on these tasks were significantly 
correlated: Pearson’s r = 0.267; p  = 0.027, 2- tailed. This analysis was repeated 
controlling for IQ and executive function scores, and the association remained:
Pearson’s r = 0.274; p = 0.026.
4.3.4 Median split analyses by total schizotypy score.
4.3.4.1 ToM and physical stories
In order to enable comparison with Langdon and Coltheart (1999) and Pickup (2006), 
participants were split into two sub-groups based on a median split of their total O-LIFE 
standard scores (median = -0.92). A two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
carried out with two levels on the between factor of subject group (low vs. high 
schizotypy) and two levels on the repeated factor of story type (ToM vs. physical). This 
revealed a significant main effect of story type (F(l, 68) = 41.63; p < 0.0001), which 
reflected the fact that participants scored significantly more poorly on the physical
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stories than the ToM stories, and a non-significant main effect of subject group (F(l, 68) 
= 1 ,4 4 ; p = 0.24). This reflected the fact that neither group (high vs. low schizotypy) 
performed significantly more poorly on all the stories (both ToM and physical). The 
story type x group interaction was also not significant (F(l, 68) = 1.53; p = 0.22).
43.4.2 Irony and literal stories
The analysis was repeated for the irony and literal stories, and again revealed a 
significant main effect of story type (F(l, 67) = 10.14; p = 0.002), consistent with 
participants scoring higher on the irony stories than the literal stories. The main effect of 
subject group was not significant (F(l, 67) = 3.16; p = 0.08), nor was the story type x 
group interaction (F(l, 67) = 0.327; p = 0.569).
4.3.4.3 Summary
The study showed that median split analyses using O-LIFE total scores do not reveal 
significant differences in ToM/ physical story performance, which replicates the results 
of Pickup (2006). For the irony stories, similar results were found, although there was a 
trend for poor performance on the irony and literal story task taken as a whole to be 
associated with higher O-LIFE scores.
43.5 Symptom subgroup analyses.
In order to test the hypothesis that schizotypal traits analogous to the “behavioural 
signs” and “positive symptoms” of schizophrenia would be associated with poorer 
performance on the story tasks, participants were split into groups based on Frith’s 
(1992) model of schizophrenia. The grouping method that was used in this study was
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that of Pickup (2006). Participants were allocated to a “behavioural signs” subgroup 
(N=18) if their sum of standard scores on the I A, IN and CD subscales of the O-LIFE 
was greater than 1. Of the remaining participants, if their standard score on the UE 
subscale of the O-LIFE was greater than 1 they were placed in the “positive symptoms” 
subgroup (N=3) and all other participants were placed in a “no symptoms” subgroup 
(N=51).
However, it was felt that it was not valid to carry out statistical analyses with groups that 
contained such different numbers of participants, especially when one group contained 
an N of 3. It was decided, therefore, that it was not possible to carry out this analysis. 
This issue is addressed more fully in the discussion.
4.3.6 Regression analysis
To facilitate comparison with Langdon and Coltheart (1999) and Pickup (2006), the 
relation between O-LIFE subscale standard scores and scores on the stories tasks for the 
whole sample was investigated using hierarchical multiple regression. To control for 
full- scale IQ (IQ) and executive function (Efn), standardised scores on the WTAR were 
entered on step 1 of the regression and scores on the Brixton test were entered on step 2. 
Following the methodology of Pickup (2006), a behavioural signs schizotypy composite 
(B) was created that consisted of the sum of the standard scores on the IA, IN and CD 
subscales of the O-LIFE, with the UE subscale standard scores making a ‘positive 
symptoms’ variable (P). The behavioural signs composite was entered on step 3 of the 
regression and the positive symptoms composite on step 4.
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Separate regressions were carried out with mean ToM score, mean physical score, 
transformed mean irony score and transformed mean literal score as dependent 
variables. All regressions met the assumption of homogeneity of variance, had normal 
distributions of standardised residuals and showed no influence of outliers. The 
regression models are shown in Tables 3 and 4 for ToM/Physical and Irony/Literal 
stories respectively, with findings significant at a 0.05 alpha level highlighted in bold.
93
4.3.6.1 ToM and physical stories
Table 3:
Hierarchical multiple regression for ToM/physical stories
Regression model ToM stories Regression model Physical stories
R2 (IQ) 0.069 R2 (IQ) 0.056
F(l,67) 4.961; p=0.029* F(l,68) 4.045; p=0.045*
ft (IQ) 0.263; p=0.029* ft (IQ) 0.237; p=0.048*
R2 (IQ+Efn) 0.0708 R2 (IQ+Efn) 0.059
F(2,66) 2.516; p=0.088. F(2,67) 2.100; p=0.130
ft (IQ) 0.260; p=0.032* ft (IQ) 0.242; p=0.046*
B(Efn) 0.044; p=0.714 B (Efn) -0.053 ;p=0.66
Finc(l,66) 0.135; p=0.714 Finc(l,67) 0.202; p=0.655
R2 (IQ+Efn+B) 0.0711 R2 (IQ+Efn+B) 0.122
F(3,65) 1.660; p=0.184 F(3,66) 3.058; p=0.034
ft (IQ) 2.60; p=0.034* ft (IQ) 0.230; p=0.052
B (Efn) 0.047; p=0.702 B (Efn) -0.101;p=0.394
ft (B) 0.017; p=0.886 ft (B) -0.256;p=0.033*
Finc(l,65) 0.021; p=0.886 Finc(l,66) 4.739; p=0.033*
R2 (IQ+Efn+B+P) 0.097 R2 (IQ+Efn+B+P) 0.124
F(4,64) 1.709; p=0.159 F(4,65) 2.299; p=0.068
B (IQ) 0.288; p=0.020* ft (IQ) 0.237; p=0.046*
15 (Efn) 0.066; p=0.590 B (Efn) -0.096;p=0.425
15(B) 0.239; p=0.247 ft (B) -0.194;p=0.346
6(P) -0.272; p=0.185 B(P) -0.076;p=0.708
Finc(l,64) 1.797; p=0.185 Finc(l,65) 0.142;p=0.708
* = significant at p < 0.05
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This table shows that full-scale IQ was the only significant predictor of ToM story 
scores, remaining significant with the inclusion of the other variables in the model, with 
higher IQ being associated with a higher ToM story score, B(IQ) = 0.288; p = 0.020. 
Full-Scale IQ also predicted performance on the physical stories, again with higher IQ 
being associated with better story performance, B(IQ) = 0.237; p = 0.046. For the 
physical stories, the inclusion of the behavioural signs composite also significantly 
increased the proportion of variance explained, with increased Behavioural signs 
associated with decreased story score, B(B) = -0.256; p = 0.033. Interestingly, this result 
disappeared with the inclusion of the Positive symptoms scores in the model, suggesting 
that this was not a robust finding.
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4.3.6.2 Irony and literal stories
Table 4:
Hierarchical multiple recession for irony/ literal stories
Regression model Irony stories Regression model Literal stories
R2 (IQ) 0.0156 R2 (IQ) 0.032
F(1,66) 1.046; p=0.310 F(l,68) 2.256; p=0.138
13 (IQ) 0.125; p=0.310 ft (IQ) 0.179; p=0.138
R2 (IQ+Efn) 0.0157 R2 (IQ+Efn) 0.041
F(2,65) 0.519; p=0.598 F(2,67) 1.435; p=0.245
13 (IQ) 0.126; p=0.312 ft (IQ) 0.170; p=0.161
13 (Efn) -0.10; p=0.936 13 (Efn) 0.095; p=0.432
Finc(l,66) 0.007; p=0.936 Finc(l,67) 0.626; p=0.432
R2 (IQ+Efn+B) 0.0162 R2 (IQ+Efn+B) 0.0607
F(3,64) 0.350; p=0.789 F(3,66) 1.421; p=0.244
13 (IQ) 0.125; p=0.317 ft (IQ) 0.164; p=0.177
13 (Efn) -0.01; p=0.915 13 (Efn) 0.068; p=0.576
15(B) -0.02; p=0.864 13(B) -0.14; p=0.245
Finc(l,65) 0.030; p=0.864 Finc(l,66) 1.379; p=0.245
R2 (IQ+Efn+B+P) 0.087 R2 (IQ+Efn+B+P) 0.0614
F(4,63) 1.492; p=0.215 F(4,65) 1.063; p=0.382
ft (IQ) 0.173; p=0.164 ft (IQ) 0.162; p=0.174
13 (Efn) 0.017; p=0.893 13 (Efn) 0.072; p=0.565
13(B) 0.351; p=0.098 13(B) -0.11; p=0.620
13 (P) -0.46; p=0.031* 13 (P) -0.05; p=0.827
Finc(l,64) 4.852; p=0.031* Finc(l,65) 0.048; p=0.827
* = significant at p < 0.05
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There was no association between scores on the Irony stories and IQ, executive function 
or Behavioural signs. However, Positive symptoms were associated with a lower Irony 
story score, 6(P) = -0.46; p = 0.031, and addition of this predictor to the model 
significantly increased the proportion of variance explained, Finc(l,64) = 4.852; p =
0.031. Scores on the literal stories were not significantly related to any of the predictor 
variables.
4.3.6.3 Correction for Type I  error
In order to minimise the risk of Type I error, it was felt important to test at a 
conservative alpha of 0.05/2 (0.025). This level of alpha was adopted because two pairs 
of regressions were carried out, and this constituted a more rigorous approach.
With this conservative alpha, the finding that IQ predicts ToM story scores remained 
significant, while the other findings were reduced to strong trends.
4.3.6.4 Summary
IQ was the only robust predictor of scores on the ToM stories and there was a strong 
trend that IQ predicted physical story scores. There was also a strong trend for 
schizotypal traits analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia to predict irony 
scores, while none of the variables predicted literal story scores.
4.4 Story response times
Because participants’ responses to stories were recorded onto cassette as the stories were 
playing, it was possible to capture this information onto a PC and, through study of the 
waveforms, obtain an accurate response time for each story. Median times were
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calculated for each participant per story type, and were analysed in the same way as the 
story scores reported above. Due to space restrictions, only significant, relevant results 
will be reported.
For the whole sample, the means, SDs and range of median response times on the four 
story types are given in Table 5.
Table 5:
Mean time data
Story type N Mean (SD)/sec Range/sec
ToM 70 1.56 (0.63) 0.73-4.36
Physical 71 2.04 (0.95) 0.88-5.68
Irony 69 1.73 (0.74) 0.92-5.14
Literal 71 2.46(1.35) 0.88-7.95
No outliers were found in these variables. Median times for all stories were significantly 
positively skewed. ToM and physical story times were log transformed and irony and 
literal stories were inversely transformed in order to fulfil the assumption of normality 
necessary for parametric tests. These transformations removed the skewness.
As with the story scores, there was a significant difference between the median times on 
the ToM and physical stories (within-subjects Mest: t(J\) = -6.64;p  < 0.001, 2-tailed), 
with participants taking longer to answer physical stories, and the irony and literal 
stories (within-subjects Mest: t( l\)  = 8.96; p  = 0.002, 2-tailed), with participants taking 
longer to answer literal stories. This gives more weight to the hypothesis that the
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physical and literal stories were found more difficult by participants than the ToM and 
irony stories.
4.4.1 Correlation between times for ToM and irony scores
An analysis was performed to establish whether median times on the ToM and irony 
stories were correlated. This showed that the transformed median times were 
significantly negatively correlated (Pearson’s r = -0.685; p  < 0.0001). The negative 
correlation is explicable by the nature of the transformations used, and is consistent with 
higher response times on the ToM and irony stories being associated with each other. 
This significant association remained when Full-Scale IQ and executive function were 
controlled for (Pearson’s r = -0.724;p  < 0.0001).
4.4.2 Median split analyses by total schizotypy score.
Median split analyses showed no significant relationships between high and low 
schizotypy and median response times for any story type.
4.4.4 Regression analysis
Regression analyses with median times as dependent variables yielded no significant 
findings.
4.5 Mental state language in ToM and irony stories
Participants were awarded a point for each mental state term they used in their answers, 
and were also awarded 1, 2 or 3 points if they used a first, second or third order 
attribution respectively. This then gave a total mental state score for each participant on
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each story type. Analyses of these variables using median split and correlational 
analyses revealed no significant relationships between schizotypy and use of mental 
state attributions.
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5. Discussion
This study predicted that the performance on two tasks designed to measure ToM 
ability, the ToM/ physical stories task and understanding of irony stories task, would 
depend on participants’ degree of schizotypy, as measured by the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 
1995). Further predictions were made that scores on both tasks would be correlated, and 
that those schizotypal traits analogous to the behavioural signs of schizophrenia would 
be associated with the greatest impairment on the two tasks, followed by those traits 
analogous to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, in line with Frith’s (1992) theory.
These hypotheses were partially supported. Regression analysis showed that higher 
scores on the UE subscale of the O-LIFE predicted poorer understanding of irony, a 
finding that was reduced to a strong trend with the use of a conservative alpha to control 
for Type I error. However, the hypotheses were only supported from the results of the 
understanding of irony task, while scores on the ToM/ physical stories task were found 
by regression analyses to be predicted by IQ, and not schizotypy scores. The findings 
from the irony task will be discussed before those from the ToM/ physical stories.
5.1 Understanding of irony task
This study found that schizotypy was associated with performance on the irony task, in 
line with the study hypothesis. Langdon and Coltheart (2004) found that participants 
with high schizotypy, as measured by the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: 
Raine, 1991), had greater difficulty understanding irony than those measured low in 
schizotypy. In the present study, total schizotypy scores measured by the O-LIFE were 
not found to be associated with scores on the irony stories. However, regression analysis
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showed a strong trend for higher scores on the UE subscale of the O-LIFE to predict 
poorer understanding of irony, while the literal stories showed no such association.
Pickup (2006) used the O-LIFE to measure schizotypy, and also found that total scores 
were not associated with scores on his ToM task. He suggested that this could have been 
due to the use of the O-LIFE rather than the SPQ, which is based on the DSM criteria for 
schizotypal personality disorder and has a strong focus on schizotypal traits analogous to 
the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Indeed, Pickup (2006) reported that about half 
of its total measured schizotypy is similar to the Unusual Experiences (UE) dimension of 
the O-LIFE. Therefore, the SPQ is closer to the UE subscale of the O-LIFE than it is to 
the O-LIFE as a whole, and this may account for both Pickup’s (2006) findings and the 
findings reported here. In other words, the association that Langdon and Coltheart 
(2004) found between total SPQ scores and scores on their understanding of irony task 
may be the same association that this study found between the UE subscale of the O- 
LIFE and understanding of irony.
These similar results are in contrast to the results of studies that have investigated irony 
comprehension in individuals with schizophrenia. For example, poor understanding of 
irony has been associated with positive formal thought disorder (Langdon et al. 2002), 
while other studies have found that participants with schizophrenia in remission 
performed more poorly than controls (Herold, Tenyi, Lenard, & Trixler, 2002) or that 
those with schizophrenia showed no impairment in their understanding of irony (Drury, 
Robinson, & Birchwood, 1998). Mitchley et al. (1998), using the irony task that the 
present study adapted, found that poor irony comprehension was associated with
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negative symptoms and not with positive ones. These mixed results could be due to the 
methodological issues discussed above, and further research is needed. Further 
investigation of the relationship between schizotypy and irony comprehension in non- 
clinical samples is also necessary in order to build on the results of this study and those 
of Langdon and Coltheart (2004). The finding that schizotypal traits analogous to 
positive symptoms may be more relevant to mental state understanding in non-clinical 
samples than those analogous to negative symptoms is discussed in more detail below.
5.2 ToM/physical stories task
It was hypothesised that scores on the ToM stories task would also be associated with 
schizotypy. However, regression analysis revealed that instead of schizotypy, IQ was the 
only robust predictor of performance on this task, with both ToM and physical story 
performance being predicted by IQ.
Pickup (2006) used the same ToM/ physical stories task and reported a similar pattern of 
results to that found in the irony/literal stories task in the present study: scores on the UE 
subscale of the O-LIFE predicted scores on the ToM task, but not scores on the physical 
stories task. IQ was not found to be associated with scores on the ToM/physical stories 
task in Pickup’s (2006) study. Therefore, the results of the present study appear to 
contradict those of Pickup (2006). However, a fundamental difference exists between 
this study and that of Pickup’s: the mode of presentation of the stories. In Pickup, 
participants were permitted to re-read the stories as often as they wished before 
answering. Pickup (2006) hypothesised that this methodology prevented his participants 
from using their “on-line” ToM skills, and in an attempt to address this issue, in the
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present study stories were presented once aurally to participants, who were then asked 
for a response. It was thought that this would maximise participants’ reliance on their 
“on-line” ToM skills, and so would reveal a greater association between schizotypy and 
ToM task scores.
However, this methodology appears to have lead to participants relying on their IQ- 
dependent problem solving skills to answer the ToM/ physical stories. Interestingly, this 
was not found to be the case for the irony/ literal stories, as IQ was not found to be 
associated with irony task performance. A reason for this could have been the 
differences between the two sets of stories. In the ToM/ physical task, the average length 
of each story was 95 words, while in the understanding of irony task the average length 
of each story was 30 words. As well as being three times longer on average, the ToM/ 
physical stories were more complicated (see appendices 4 and 5) with participants being 
required to hold more information in mind than in the irony/ literal stories. Because the 
ToM/ physical stories were longer and more complicated, it is possible that participants 
had to use IQ-dependent problem solving skills to answer the questions, instead of 
relying on their ToM skills. In the understanding of irony task, however, the shorter and 
simpler stories may have allowed participants to rely only on their ToM skills.
This has interesting implications for further research in this area because it reveals that a 
balance must be found between task difficulty and mode of presentation when 
considering task design in ToM studies. In other words, tasks must be designed to 
maximise reliance on “on-line” processing, but must not be so difficult as to encourage 
the use of IQ-dependent problem solving skills. It also shows the importance of 
controlling for IQ when carrying out research into ToM and schizotypy. Pickup (2006)
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was the first person to include a measure of IQ in an investigation of ToM and 
schizotypy, and his analysis revealed no associations between IQ and ToM task scores. 
Studies with individuals with schizophrenia, however, have found such a link (Pickup 
and Frith, 2001), and it has been suggested that individuals with schizophrenia rely on 
their IQ-dependent problem solving skills because their ToM skills are impaired, while 
in non-clinical samples, ToM skills were presumed to be intact and so individuals in 
these samples were hypothesised not to need to use problem-solving skills (Corcoran et 
al., 1995). The results of this study, however, suggest that the picture is more 
complicated, and that non-clinical individuals’ IQ-dependent skills may also take over 
when task difficulty reaches a certain level. It is possible that it is this threshold that 
changes across different populations. Individuals with schizophrenia may need to rely on 
their IQ skills at a lower level of task difficulty than individuals without schizophrenia, 
possibly because of their impaired ToM skills.
5.3 Symptom subgroup analysis
In line with Frith’s (1992) theory, this study hypothesised that the greatest ToM 
impairments would be associated with schizotypal traits analogous to the “behavioural 
signs” of schizophrenia, followed by the schizotypal traits analogous to positive 
symptoms. This hypothesis was partially supported by the finding that UE subscale 
scores predicted performance on the irony task, but no association was found between 
traits analogous to behavioural signs and performance.
Following the methodology of Pickup (2006), this study attempted to allocate 
participants to subgroups based on Frith’s (1992) model of schizophrenia, such that
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those with only schizotypal traits analogous to the “behavioural signs” or “positive 
symptoms” of schizophrenia could be compared. However, this was not possible due to 
the small numbers of participants who demonstrated schizotypal traits analogous to 
“positive symptoms” in the absence of traits analogous to “behavioural signs”. This 
brings up an interesting methodological limitation of the study, namely the rigour of the 
sampling procedure used. Because the O-LIFE has four sub-scales, it would have been 
ideal to have been able to recruit participants who showed a range of scores on each 
subscale, rather than a range of total schizotypy scores. Further, it may have been 
possible to increase the chances of obtaining a wide range of scores on the UE subscale 
of the O-LIFE by targeting recruitment to populations that have been shown in previous 
studies to score highly on that subscale, for example members of New Religious 
Movements (e.g. Day and Peters, 1999). In this way, it may have been possible to ensure 
that there were sufficient numbers in each group to facilitate statistical analyses.
Langdon and Coltheart (1999) reported mixed results regarding the contribution of 
schizotypal traits analogous to behavioural signs. In their first experiment, participants 
with poorer ToM scores were more likely to rate items on the SPQ that related to 
interpersonal traits, analogous to negative behavioural signs, as well as cognitive- 
perceptual items, analogous to positive symptoms. In their second experiment, however, 
those with poor ToM scores were more likely to rate disorganised and cognitive- 
perceptual items.
Pickup (2006) found no association between ToM scores and schizotypal traits 
analogous to “behavioural signs”, and suggested that this may again have been related to
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the mode of presentation of his stories. He hypothesised that the reduction of reliance on 
“on-line” processing skills could have reduced task sensitivity to the effects of the other 
dimensions of schizotypy. The findings of the present study cast doubt on this 
hypothesis, because traits analogous to “behavioural signs” were not found to be 
associated with scores on the irony task, which was presented in such a way as to 
maximise participants’ reliance on on-line processing.
Pickup (2006) also suggested that a difference may be emerging in ToM research 
between studies of schizotypy in a non-clinical sample and studies of individuals with 
schizophrenia. Many studies of individuals with schizophrenia have found clear 
associations between poor scores on ToM tasks and the presence of “behavioural signs” 
(e.g. Corcoran et al., 1995; Grieg et al., 2004; Sarfati et al., 1997), while a more mixed 
picture has been found for positive symptoms (e.g. Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Mazza et al., 
2001). In the research with non-clinical samples to date, the predominant effect has been 
the association between poor ToM and schizotypal traits analogous to positive 
symptoms, such as the UE subscale of the O-LIFE (Pickup, 2006) or the cognitive- 
perceptual dimension of the SPQ (Langdon and Coltheart, 1999; 2004). The present 
study conformed to the hypothesis that non-clinical samples may be more likely to 
display associations between positive traits and poorer ToM skills. Pickup (2006) 
suggested that this may be due to the fact that these traits are the strongest index of 
psychosis-proneness in healthy individuals. Another reason for this finding may be 
related to the characteristics of the onset and course of schizophrenia. There is debate 
concerning the primacy of positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia. As 
Andreasen, Roy and Flaum (1995) state, there is a recognition that some negative
symptoms may occur as a result of factors that are unrelated to underlying neural 
deficits, for example the side effects of neuroleptic medication, depression, a response to 
positive symptoms and environmental understimulation resulting from repeated or 
prolonged hospitalisation. Hafner et al. (1995) showed that on admission to hospital, 
positive symptoms tended to dominate the clinical picture, while six months on, negative 
symptoms tended to be more prominent. Further, Yung and McGorry (1996) found that 
the subjective experiences of prodromal and early psychotic signs clearly preceded the 
behavioural changes recognizable by the social environment. Therefore, it may be that 
positive symptoms in schizophrenia occur first, followed by the behavioural signs. It 
would be expected, therefore, that investigations with samples recruited from hospital 
wards would find a closer association between ToM performance and behavioural signs, 
especially negative behavioural signs, while studies of non-clinical samples would be 
more likely to find an association between ToM performance and traits analogous to 
positive symptoms.
5.4 ToM and Irony scores correlation
Despite the fact that scores on the ToM stories were associated with IQ and scores on 
the irony stories were associated with schizotypy, the two sets of scores were 
significantly correlated, as were the response times for both sets of stories. Therefore, 
those who scored highly and took less time on one set of stories also scored highly and 
took less time to answer the other set of stories, even though they may have been using 
different skills on each task. Unexpectedly, these correlations remained significant when 
IQ was controlled for. That a correlation between ToM and problem-solving ability 
independent of IQ was found implies that a third mechanism may have been influencing
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both sets of scores. This could be due to the fact that both IQ-dependent problem solving 
and ToM share certain skills, for example holding information in mind and processing 
that information. This overlap in skills required for both sets of tasks could account for 
the association in task scores.
5.5 Executive function
As well as IQ, executive function was also controlled for using the Brixton test (Burgess 
& Shallice, 1997). This was important because previous studies have shown that high 
schizotypy is associated with poor executive function (e.g. Raine et al., 1992), and 
Russell (1998) proposed that individuals who scored poorly on ToM tasks did so 
because of a specific executive impairment in being “captured” by and responding to 
salient but irrelevant material. In their study of ToM and schizotypy, Langdon and 
Coltheart (1999) controlled for the effects of executive function through a task that they 
designed in which participants had to disregard salient but irrelevant information in 
order to sequence pictures correctly. In their study, Langdon and Coltheart (1999) found 
that the association between ToM and schizotypy was unrelated to executive function, as 
did Pickup (2006), who included the Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice & Evans, 1978) 
in his study, although he did comment that this test may not have been sufficiently 
sensitive to detect difficulties with inhibition. The Brixton test (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997) was included in the present study because it is sensitive to tendencies towards 
impulsive behaviour, which could underlie Russell’s (1998) hypothesis. Consistent with 
the findings of Langdon and Coltheart (1999) and Pickup (2006), no association was 
found between scores on the Brixton test and scores on either of the ToM tasks or
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schizotypy measures. The results of these studies taken together, therefore, cast doubt on 
Russell’s (1998) hypothesis.
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5.6 Summary
This study provided evidence in partial support of Frith’s (1992) cognitive 
neuropsychological model of schizophrenia. An association was found between 
schizotypy traits analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia and ToM 
performance measured by a task requiring the understanding of irony. No association 
was found between traits analogous to “behavioural signs” and ToM, contrary to Frith’s 
(1992) theory. This study also highlighted the need for tasks to be developed that 
maximise reliance on “on-line” processing skills while not being so difficult that they 
encourage participants to rely on mainly IQ-dependent problem solving skills.
I l l
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Part 3: Critical appraisal
1. Introduction
This critical appraisal will discuss certain issues of particular interest to me that have 
come out of this research. Firstly, methodological limitations that have arisen from the 
study will be discussed, followed by the appeal of Frith’s (1992) model and some 
observations about the schizotypy paradigm and its use in theory of mind (ToM) 
research. Then, clinical applications of Frith’s theory will be discussed from a cognitive 
behavioural viewpoint in the main, but also from a family therapy perspective. Finally, 
some directions for future research will be detailed.
2. Methodological limitations
There are several methodological issues that this study has raised. Firstly, the mode of 
presentation of the stories to participants, and secondly issues arising from sampling. In 
the planning phase of the study, I had wanted to devise a way of presenting the ToM 
tasks to participants such that they were as “real-world” as possible. In other words, it 
was important to try to get away from the kinds of presentation in which participants 
could read the stories as many times as they wished, or were supplied with props, 
pictures and so on, and attempt to reproduce everyday communicative interactions as 
much as possible. This was because Pickup (2006) had hypothesised that his method of 
presentation (allowing participants to read the stories as often as they wished before 
answering) may have contributed to him not finding any association between schizotypal 
traits analogous to behavioural signs and ToM task performance. The methodology that I 
devised for this purpose was the recording of the stories on compact disc, and then the 
playing of the stories in a random order to participants, who were then asked to answer 
out loud.
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Unfortunately, this methodology had unforeseen consequences. In the planning phase, I 
did not take into account the impact of the length and difficulty of the ToM/physical 
stories. This seems to have resulted in participants relying on their IQ-dependent 
problem solving skills rather than their ToM skills with these stories. Because the 
irony/literal stories are much shorter and less complicated, participants were able to use 
their ToM skills to answer these. Any future study using this methodology would benefit 
greatly from finding an alternative task to the ToM/physical stories, as it was not 
possible in this study to establish whether there was any meaningful correlation between 
irony and ToM tasks, or any association between ToM skills and schizotypy using this 
task and method of presentation.
Another interesting issue arising from the stories is the fact that participants found the 
physical and literal stories harder than the ToM and irony stories respectively. I suspect 
that this was due to different reasons in the different tasks. In the ToM/physical tasks, 
the physical stories are more abstract, and so it could have been more difficult for 
participants to hold all of the required information in their minds in order to give a 
correct response. In the literal stories, however, I believe that the stories were too 
simple, and that participants felt that the answer could not be so obvious. In the original 
presentation of the task (Mitchley et al., 1998), three possible answers were supplied 
with each story, and participants were asked to choose one of these answers. This would 
have given the participants the cue that, in fact, the experimenters were looking for the 
obvious answer. In the present study, however, the three possible answers were not 
supplied so that the story format remained as close as possible to the other task.
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The second methodological issue is that of sampling. Participants were recruited through 
the UCL psychology department subject pool, and were screened for total schizotypy 
using the STA. This gave a large number of participants who were in the mid-schizotypy 
range, with only small numbers who were high or low. Further, very small numbers 
were high in the Unusual Experiences subscale of the O-LIFE and low in the other three 
scales, which meant that it was not possible to conduct reliable analyses with 
participants allocated to subgroups depending of schizotypy traits analogous to Frith’s 
(1992) schizophrenia symptom classifications, which is disappointing.
If unlimited time and funds had been available to me, I would have recruited and 
screened participants differently. For example, it would have been very useful to screen 
participants using the O-LIFE, thus ensuring that there was a range of scores on each of 
die four subscales, as well as participants who were high in UE but low in the other three 
scales. Because the O-LIFE is a rather long questionnaire it would have been necessary 
to pay participants to fill it in, and then pay them again to complete the rest of the study. 
It would not be reasonable to ask participants to fill in the O-LIFE and then tell them 
that they were not needed for the rest of the study, and so would not be paid.
It would also have been possible to carry out targeted recruitment in order to specifically 
focus on populations that have been previously found to vary in schizotypy, such as 
members of New Religious Movements (Day & Peters, 1999) or those who are 
particularly creative or artistic (Claridge, 1997). Again, this might have increased the 
chances of getting a wider range of scores on the four scales.
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3. Frith’s cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia
This study appealed to me because it was investigating Frith’s (1992) theory of 
schizophrenia. Frith’s theory is interesting because it takes a symptom-based view of 
schizophrenia, rather than treating schizophrenia as a single heterogeneous construct. In 
doing so, Frith departed from more traditional medical models of schizophrenia as a 
“brain disease” and generated an approach that seems more compatible with 
psychological approaches to treatment. As Boyle (2002) comments, there is little direct 
evidence to support the view that schizophrenia is a “brain disease”, despite the strength 
of the belief that it is.
Although Frith took a symptom-based approach to schizophrenia, he combined it with 
more traditional cognitive and neuropsychological approaches, which aimed to account 
for patients’ performance on certain psychological tasks. For example Callaway and 
Naghdi (1982) proposed their model of impaired controlled processing in schizophrenia 
to explain patients’ poor performance on capacity-demanding tasks such as word recall, 
and Shallice, Burgess and Frith (1991) proposed executive function deficits following 
poor performance of individuals with schizophrenia on tasks sensitive to frontal lobe 
damage. The principle of developing a theory that can be tested experimentally through 
task performance is very useful, as it is amenable to evaluation, and by combining 
symptom- and task-based models Frith developed a model that was both intuitively 
plausible and open to experimental validation.
Frith’s model is intuitively plausible because individuals with schizophrenia do often 
have autistic-like presentations. The flat affect, social withdrawal and other hallmark
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negative symptoms of schizophrenia do resemble those of autism. Further, his account 
of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia as malfunctioning theory of mind is also 
persuasive. For example, it would be reasonable to think of paranoid symptoms as 
stemming from an impairment of the mechanism that regulates our relationships with the 
world and with other people. ToM is one such mechanism, as the understanding of an 
other’s mental states is essential for the understanding of one’s relationship with that 
person.
A second reason that Frith’s theory is one that appears convincing is its inherent relation 
to another domain of schizophrenia theory: the role of the family. The family dynamics 
that are hypothesised to be contributory to the development of and relapse to 
schizophrenia (high ‘expressed emotion’: e.g. Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998) imply that 
dysfunctional interaction between people could be significant in schizophrenia’s 
aetiology. Because a central theme of Frith’s theory is impaired theory of mind (ToM), 
which has long been seen as a crucial tool in the navigation of the social world (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978), his theory fits well with other schizophrenia models that highlight 
the importance of interactions between people.
Although Frith’s theory seems to be open to experimental investigation due to the fact 
that it generates specific predictions that can be tested, a major difficulty with the 
validation of his theory stems from the fact that individuals with schizophrenia tend to 
present with several symptoms at the same time. For example, it is rare to find patients 
who exhibit behavioural signs in the absence of positive symptoms or passivity 
symptoms, as it is rare to find patients with only positive symptoms and no behavioural
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signs. This means that individual symptom-based predictions are difficult to confirm, 
because the overlap in symptomatology makes it difficult to isolate individual symptoms 
and therefore test specific predictions. Studies using non-clinical samples, such as the 
present study, have tried to by-pass this difficulty using the schizotypy paradigm. 
However, this difficulty appears to occur in this population as well. In this study, there 
were very small numbers of people who were high in schizotypal traits analogous to 
positive symptoms and low in those traits analogous to behavioural signs. In a future 
study it would be useful to manage recruitment such that the performance on tasks of a 
subgroup of individuals who score highly on the UE subscale of the O-LIFE but not on 
the other subscales can be investigated. This was not possible in this study due to time 
and financial constraints.
4. Schizotypy
A dimension of the schizotypy paradigm that is interesting and has received little 
attention in the literature to date is the issue of whether low schizotypes really are more 
“normal” than high schizotypes. Studies that have investigated the schizotypy paradigm 
have tended to discuss a continuum of “psychosis-proneness” (Claridge, 1997) such that 
individuals high in schizotypy are considered akin to those with schizophrenia, while 
those with low schizotypy are considered “normal”. Studies seem to presume that a 
straight-line continuum exists from “normal” at one end to “psychotic” at the other, as 
evidenced by the use of correlational analyses such as regression, which assume a 
straight-line relationship. However, it is not obvious that this is the case. Loughland and 
Williams (1997) used cluster analysis to show that different clusters of individuals exist 
when the O-LIFE is administered to a non-psychiatric population. They called these
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clusters: low schizotypy, introvertive anhedonia, unusual experiences and cognitive 
disorganisation, based on the defining feature of each cluster. This study showed that 
there was a distinct subgroup of individuals who scored low in each of the four domains 
of the O-LIFE. Individuals who score low in schizotypy as measured by the O-LIFE 
may exhibit, very broadly, concrete thinking, be highly cognitively organised, 
unimpulsive and extroverted. While this pattern of personality traits is not akin to those 
associated with schizophrenia, it is perhaps not one that could be considered “normal” 
either. This implies that the psychosis continuum is not likely to be a straight line, but 
rather shaped such that those at either end would be considered “odd”, with “normality” 
being the exhibition of a mixture of schizotypal traits.
This has clear implications for studies that use the schizotypy paradigm. It does not seem 
enough to presume that low schizotypes are “normal” and therefore should be thought of 
in a similar way to a non-psychotic control group. Rather, low schizotypes should be 
investigated further in their own right. This has particular relevance to studies of ToM 
and schizotypy, as, although it has been found that low schizotypes perform better on 
ToM tasks than high schizotypes, it does not necessarily follow that they are using their 
ToM ability to carry out the tasks. For example, as detailed above, low schizotypes 
would be very cognitively organised so could be using problem solving skills, and 
would be un-impulsive, which could also give them an advantage over those with high 
schizotypy.
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5. Clinical applications
The finding that ToM is impaired in people with schizophrenia has clear implications for 
psychological treatments. CBT and family interventions are the current recommended 
treatments for schizophrenia in the NHS following the publication of NICE guidelines in 
2003 (NICE, 2003), and some of the implications of Frith’s model for each treatment 
mode will be considered.
5.1 Cognitive Behaviour Therapy
Fowler, Garety and Kuipers (2000) describe the process of cognitive behaviour therapy 
for psychosis as a series of 6 stages: engagement and assessment, the implementation of 
cognitive behavioural coping strategies for psychotic symptoms, collaborative 
discussion of a new model of psychosis, cognitive therapy strategies for delusions, 
cognitive therapy for dysfunctional assumptions, and relapse prevention techniques.
A fundamental way in which Frith’s theory can inform the practice of CBT is in 
providing therapists with an understanding of why it may be more difficult to engage 
clients with schizophrenia. It would be important for therapists to bear in mind that their 
expectations of relationship building may have to be altered for this client group, if 
individuals with schizophrenia find it difficult to infer the mental states of others. It may 
be that perceived resistance on the part of the client could be re-formulated in a more 
useful way as being part of the client’s difficulties, and could be worked with in this way 
through the process of therapy. If a client with schizophrenia has difficulty with the 
attribution of mental states, it may be more difficult to come to a shared understanding 
with that client, and to therefore develop the connectedness that, I believe, is the basis 
for the deepening of the therapeutic relationship. At least, the therapist may have to
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understand that the client finds this more difficult, and may therefore have to work 
harder to come to shared understandings.
A second area of CBT that Frith’s model has relevance to is the collaborative discussion 
of a new model of psychosis. This is because the notion that a client has impairments in 
ToM is one that is explainable, and relatively easy to understand. Frith’s model could be 
a useful framework within which to normalise the experience of the client, and to allow 
the client to develop a new position from which to view their difficulties. For example, 
explaining that humans have the ability to think about other people’s thoughts and 
beliefs, and that this ability can go wrong, may give a client the opportunity to shift their 
thinking about their paranoid beliefs.
A third area of CBT that is relevant here is working with delusional beliefs. When 
working with delusional beliefs, Fowler et al. (2000) suggested that evidence for the 
belief should be elicited from the patient, as well as unwanted consequences of changing 
the belief. Then, alternative viewpoints and explanations should be generated in 
collaboration with the client with the aim of reducing distress. Frith’s (1992) theory 
could be employed usefully as a framework within which alternative explanations for 
events are considered, for example by considering alternative mental states that a person 
may have held in a given situation. The rationale for this is that if a patient is distressed 
because they believe that someone else holds a negative intention or belief about them, 
then consideration of alternative mental states may reduce their paranoia and distress. 
This relies on the client having at least a partially intact ToM ability, and as Frith’s 
theory proposes that patients with paranoid symptoms have an intact but malfunctioning
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ToM, it should be possible to enter into a dialogue about mental states with clients with 
paranoid symptoms. Also, as studies have shown (e.g. Pickup & Frith, 2001), 
individuals with negative symptoms can retain 1st order ToM ability while their 2nd order 
abilities are impaired, and so they also may be able to enter into discussion about others’ 
mental states, given that clinicians pitch their intervention at the right level. A question 
is raises concerns how this work could best be carried out. Through work with children 
with Autistic Spectrum Disorder, who are also hypothesised to have ToM deficits, 
protocols have been developed for teaching children ToM skills using pictorial 
representations, such as thought bubbles (e.g. Wellman et al., 2002). Individuals with 
schizophrenia also appear to have intact understanding of pictorial representation, 
irrespective of their ToM ability (Pickup & Frith, 2001), and so this is a technique that 
may be able to be usefully harnessed (Pickup, unpublished manuscript).
Another component of CBT that Frith’s theory could contribute to is helping clients to 
improve their ToM skills in social situations. Although recent reviews have not found 
evidence that social skills training as a stand alone treatment is effective (e.g. Pilling et 
al., 2002), it has been argued that social skills training does play a role in CBT, for 
example through homework that takes the client into social situations in a graded way, 
and through the reality testing of delusions that involves interpreting the social 
behaviour of others. ToM-based social skills training has been investigated in a study 
carried out by Roncone et al. (2004), in which a small sample of 10 individuals with 
schizophrenia were given a social skills intervention consisting of six modules about 
topics including emotion recognition, communication of feelings, and managing 
common social situations. These patients showed an overall reduction in negative 
symptoms compared to a second group of 10 individuals with schizophrenia who
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received supportive psychotherapy as a control intervention. Despite the fact that the 
samples involved in their study are small, this is an interesting finding that warrants 
further investigation.
5.2 Family therapy
The second recommended treatment for schizophrenia in the NICE guidelines is family 
therapy, or family interventions. These are based on the observation that high levels of 
criticism and emotional involvement (termed high ‘expressed emotion’, EE) are 
predictive of relapse to schizophrenia (e.g. Bebbington & Kruipers, 1994). Frith’s theory 
is relevant here because ToM is widely thought of as essential for effective social 
interaction. The emotional environment within the family is likely to be affected by the 
degree to which family members are able to understand and infer each others’ mental 
states. It is possible that the high levels of criticism and emotional involvement that are 
hallmarks of high EE could be due to, or at least influenced by, impairment in the ToM 
of family members, as well as the individual with schizophrenia. Janssen, Krabbendam, 
Jolles and van Os (2003) found that non-psychotic first-degree relatives were impaired 
on a ToM task compared to controls, with patients with schizophrenia performing worst 
of the three groups. This study shows that both patients with schizophrenia and their 
relatives display ToM difficulties. Therefore, family interventions may benefit from the 
introduction of social skills training specific to ToM, as detailed above. This would not 
be out of place in these interventions, as the NICE guidelines defined family 
interventions as containing an element of psychoeducation or problem solving work, 
into which ToM training could fit.
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6. Future directions
This paper has identified various areas that would benefit from further investigation. 
Firstly, it will be important to recruit specific samples of individuals in order that those 
who have isolated schizotypal traits can be compared. Secondly, it would be interesting 
to investigate those individuals who are low in schizotypy in order to begin to establish 
whether there is indeed a straight-line continuum for psychosis. Studies evaluating the 
inclusion of ToM training in CBT and family intervention for schizophrenia would also 
be helpful in delivering the most effective treatments to patients.
As this study showed, tasks that involve the understanding of irony appear to be 
sensitive enough to discriminate between the subtle ToM impairments associated with 
differing degrees of schizotypy. Further investigations of ToM and schizotypy would 
benefit from the use of such tasks. It would also be interesting to find out the nature of 
the ToM impairment, as well as its degree. For example, is the impairment such that 
individuals over-infer mental states, or do they have difficulty inferring any mental 
states at all? Frith (2004) uses the term over-mentalising, while Abu Akel and Bailey 
(2000) use the term hyper-ToM. If it is the case that high schizotypes and those with 
psychosis are over-inferring mental states, could this be related to information- 
processing styles? If so, this could have implications for other psychological disorders 
that are hypothesised to be linked to information processing, the most obvious example 
being Brewin’ s (2001) information processing account of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Holmes and Steel (2004) showed that high schizotypy was associated with increased 
traumatic intrusions, and it is possible that the information processing styles that are 
more likely to lead to traumatic intrusions are similar to those that lead to or result from
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ToM difficulties and psychosis. Further investigation of whether information processing 
styles differ according to schizotypy would be very interesting. Frith’s (1992) model has 
been integrated into Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman and Bebbington’s (2001) 
cognitive model of psychosis, in which it is argued that a triggering event gives rise in a 
predisposed person to a disruption of cognitive processes. One way in which this could 
happen, according to the model, is through difficulties with ToM. It would be interesting 
to investigate how Frith’s theory could be integrated in other mainstream psychological 
models of other disorders, for example post-traumatic stress disorder.
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Appendix 1: 
Table o f schizophrenia studies reviewed
Authors Participants Measures Symptoms Headline Results Comments
1. Corcoran, • 55 patients with • Hinting task: Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with IQ covaried out:
Mercer & schizophrenia all items read symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia between group
Frith (1995) • 30 healthy controls aloud, • Negative features performed most differences
• 14 psychiatric controls repeated if (N=10) poorly overall remained
(anxiety/depression) necessary • Incoherence (N=3) • Negative significant
• Quick test • Paranoid (N=23) features group
• Passivity (N=7) scored worse
• Other symptoms than passivity,
(N=4) remission,
• Remission (N=8) controls
• Paranoid and
incoherent
group worse
than controls
2. Frith & • 55 patients with • 6 theory of Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with Matched for IQ
Corcoran schizophrenia mind stories: symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia
(1996) • 22 healthy controls 1st and 2nd • Behavioural signs performed most Only significant
• 13 psychiatric controls order false (N=12) poorly overall findings for 2nd
(anxiety/ depression) belief and • Paranoid (N=24) • Behavioural order stories
deception read • Passivity (N=10) signs group and
aloud with • Remission (N=9) paranoid group
cartoon performed
drawings poorly
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3. Corcoran 
& Frith 
(1996)
4. Corcoran, 
Cahill & 
Frith (1997)
49 patients with •  Maxims test:
schizophrenia stories read by
13 healthy controls participants, as
10 psychiatric controls often as
(anxiety/ depression) required
• Quick test
44 patients with • Jokes task: 10
schizophrenia behavioural,
40 healthy controls 10 mental
7 psychiatric controls state,
(anxiety/depression) Participants
shown jokes in 
picture form 
•  Quick test
Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with
symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia
• Negative behavioural performed most
signs (N=10) poorly overall
• Positive symptoms • Behavioural
(N=17) signs and
• Passivity (N = ll) passivity groups
• Remission and impaired on
unusual symptoms maxim o f
(N = ll) quantity
• Behavioural 
signs impaired 
on maxim of 
quality
• Paranoid group 
more likely to 
flout politeness 
rules
Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with
symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia
• Behavioural signs performed most
(N=7) poorly overall
•  Paranoid symptoms • Behavioural
(N=16) signs group
• Passivity (N=8) worse than all
• Remission and other other groups
symptoms (N=13) • Paranoid 
symptoms and 
passivity group 
worse than 
controls on 
mental state 
jokes
Paranoid 
politeness 
finding indicates 
“on-line” deficit
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5. Pickup & • 41 patients with • 1st and 2nd Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with Matched non­
Frith (2001) schizophrenia order false symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia mental
• 35 healthy controls belief stories, • Behavioural signs performed most representation
• 18 psychiatric controls read aloud and (N=16) poorly overall task indicates no
(anxiety/ depression) enacted with • Paranoid symptoms • No differences difficulty with
Playmobil (N=16) found for 1st general
figures or • Passivity (N =l) order tests representation
other props • Remission (N=8) • Behavioural
• Corresponding signs group
non-mental worst in 2nd
representation order tests
tasks • Paranoid
• Quick test symptoms group
showed trend to
be worse than
controls
6. Randall, • 18 patients with • Digit span Allocated to groups on basis o f • Patients with Did not use
Corcoran, persecutory delusions. distraction scores on PANSS schizophrenia psychiatric
Day & Schizophrenia and task performed most control group
Bentall schizoaffective disorder • ToM stories poorly overall
(2003) • 14 remitted from Frith and • Paranoid
• 18 healthy controls Corcoran delusions
(1996)read associated with
aloud to ToM deficit
participants, • Abnormal
repeated on attributions in
request paranoid group
• Internal, found only when
Personal and rated
situational independently
attributions • Remitted
questionnaire patients not sig.
different to
paranoid healthy
control group
141
7. Corcoran • 39 patients with • Hinting task,
(2003) schizophrenia read aloud
• 44 healthy controls • Aha!
Sentences 
task,read 
aloud
• Quick Test
• Story recall 
subtest from 
AMI
• Means-ends 
problem 
solving task
Hierarchical grouping method, 
symptoms assessed using PSE
• No Behavioural signs
• Delusions: 
persecutory (N=16); 
control (N=8)
• Remission (N= 15)
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed most 
poorly overall
• In schizophrenia 
group, 
correlations 
found between 
scores on: 
Hinting task and 
Aha! Sentences; 
Hinting task and 
story recall;
Aha! Sentences 
and IQ. These 
correlations not 
present in 
control group
• Relationship 
between Hinting 
task and Aha! 
Sentences task 
weaker for 
remitted group
Individuals with 
schizophrenia 
rely on other 
cognitive 
abilities to 
perform Hinting 
task
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8. Corcoran • 59 patients with • Hinting task, Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with No
& Frith schizophrenia read aloud and symptoms assessed using PSE schizophrenia schizophrenia
(2003) • 44 healthy controls left open for • Negative behavioural performed most subgroup info
participants to signs (N=10) poorly overall given
read • Positive behavioural • Hinting task
• ToM stories signs (N=10) correlated with
from Frith and • Paranoid symptoms ToM
Corcoran (N=16) performance
(1996), read • Passivity (N=8) • Hinting task
aloud • Remission (N= 15) correlated with
• Autobiographi AMI score
cal incidents • ToM task
section of correlated with
AMI AMI score
• Quick test
• Story recall
from AMPIB
9. Russell, • 61 patients with • Animated Hierarchical grouping method, • Patients with Behavioural
Reynaud, schizophrenia sequences task symptoms assessed using schizophrenia signs and
Herba, • 22 healthy controls • Quick test SAPS and SANS performed most paranoid groups
Morris & • Behavioural signs poorly overall over-interpreting
Corcoran (N=18); included • Accuracy on non-intentional
(2006) positive (N=8) and task movement
negative (N=10) discriminated
• Paranoid symptoms Behavioural
(N=15) signs and
• Passivity (N 15) paranoid groups
• Remission (N= 13)
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10. Sarfati, 
Hardy-Bayle, 
Besche & 
Widlocher 
(1997)
• 24 patients with
schizophrenia
• 12 psychiatric controls
(depression)
• 24 healthy controls
Attribution of  
Intention task: 
comic strip 
completion 
Binois and 
Pichot vocab 
scale 
PANSS
11. Sarfati,
Hardy-Bayle,
Nadel,
Chevalier, &
Widlocher,
(1997)
12 patients with 
schizophrenia 
12 psychiatric controls 
(depression)
12 healthy controls
Attribution of  
Intention (Al) 
task: comic 
strip
completion 
False belief 
(FB) task: 
comic strip 
completion 
SAPS & 
SANS
Grouped according to 
performance on TLC
• TLC score > 7: group 
with thought and 
speech
disorganisation
(N=12)
• TLC score < 7: group 
without thought and 
speech
disorganisation
(N=T2)
Also grouped according to 
DSM IIIR subtypes:
• Paranoid (N=7)
• Residual (N=6)
• Disorganised (N=5)
• Undifferentiated 
(N=6)
Grouped according to 
performance on TLC
• TLC score > 7: group 
with thought and 
speech
disorganisation (N=6)
• TLC score < 7: group 
without thought and 
speech
disorganisation (N=6)
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed most 
poorly overall
• Group with TLC 
score > 7 
performed more 
poorly than 
other three 
groups
• No differences 
found when 
grouped 
according to 
DSM-IIIR 
subtypes
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
perfonned most 
poorly overall
•  Al- High TLC 
scores sig. 
worse
perfonnance 
than controls 
and low TLC 
scores
• FB- No 
differences 
between high, 
low TLC and 
controls
Consistent with 
Hardy-Bayle’s 
(1994) action 
planning deficit 
hypothesis
No IQ control
FB- patients 
with
schizophrenia 
performed 
worse than 
control groups
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12. Sarfati, 
Hardy-Bayle, 
Brunet, & 
Widlocher 
(1999)
13. Sarfat & 
Hardy- Bayle 
(1999)
26 patients with 
schizophrenia 
13 psychiatric controls 
(depression)
13 healthy controls
Task from 
Safarti et al 
(1997a) 
Answer cards 
contained 
either pictures 
or short 
sentences 
PANSS 
Binois and 
Pichot vocab 
scale
25 patients with 
schizophrenia 
10 psychiatric controls 
(manic)
15 healthy controls
Comic strip
completion
with stories
involving
desire/
intention
PANSS
Binois and
Pichot vocab
scale
Grouped according to • Patients with Participants
performance on TLC schizophrenia presented same
• TLC score > 7: group performed set of stories,
with thought and worse in both once with
speech pictorial and pictorial
disorganisation verbal answers and
(N=13) conditions. once with verbal
• TLC score < 7: group • No differences answers,
without thought and between therefore high
speech
disorganisation
(N=13)
disorganisation
groups
priming effect
Global PANSS 
score sig. higher 
in high
disorganisation
group
Grouped according to • Patients with Global PANSS
performance on TLC schizophrenia score sig. higher
• TLC score > 7: group performed in high
with thought and worse overall disorganisation
speech
disorganisation
(N=15)
• TLC score < 7: group 
without thought and 
speech
• Patients with 
disorganisation 
performed 
worse than those 
without and two 
controls
group
disorganisation
(N=10)
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
consistently 
chose answers 
depicting 
unambiguous 
and familiar 
situations
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14. Sarfat, •  25 patients with
Passerieux, & schizophrenia
Hardy- Bayle • 25 healthy controls
(2000)
15. Brunet, • 25 patients with
Safarti & schizophrenia
Hardy- Bayl6 • 25 healthy controls
(2003)
Replication of 
verbal/non­
verbal comic 
strip
conditions. 
Participants 
did not
complete same 
comic strips 
for each 
condition 
PANSS 
Binois and 
Pichot vocab 
scale
Comic strip 
completion, 
testing
Attribution of 
Intention, 
Physical 
causality with 
characters, 
physical 
causality with 
objects 
PANSS 
Binois and 
Pichot vocab 
scale
TLC
Poor performers 
associated with 
duration of 
illness only 
PANSS/TLC 
scores not 
associated 
than 13 correct in 
pictorial set, but 13 or 
14 correct in verbal 
set; poor- fewer than 
13 correct in both sets
•  Patients grouped •
according to 
performance on task: 
good -13 or 14 correct 
responses in pictorial •
and verbal sets; 
remediable- fewer
• Patients groups • Patients with
simply according to schizophrenia
schizophrenia vs. impaired in
control Attribution of
Intentions task, 
but not in either 
physical 
causality task
No sub­
grouping 
according to 
symptoms
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16. Langdon, • 20 patients with • Picture
Michie, schizophrenia sequencing
Ward, • 20 healthy controls task:
McConaghy, Mechanical/
Catts & social script/
Coltheart pretence/
(1997) unrealised
goal/
intention/ false 
belief 
• WAIS-R: 
block design 
and digits 
backwards
17. Langdon, 
Coltheart, 
Ward, & 
Catts (2001)
30 patients with 
schizophrenia, 2 with 
schizaffective disorder 
24 Healthy controls
Picture 
sequencing 
task: Social 
script/ 
mechanical/ 
false belief/ 
capture stories 
Visual
memory span 
subtasks from 
WMS-R 
Tower of 
London task
Patients grouped 
according to errors on 
stories
Subgroup 1: correctly 
ordered all stories 
(N=7)
Subgroup 2: only 
made errors on false 
belief stories (N=6) 
Subgroup 3: general 
sequencing difficulty 
(N=7)
Patients grouped into 
Stuart et al (1995) 
factors and sub­
factors using SAPS 
and SANS
Patients grouped into 
Stuart et al (1995) 
factors and sub­
factors using SAPS 
and SANS
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
worse on false 
belief stories
• S3 patients had 
sig. higher 
ratings of reality 
distortion than 
S2 and SI
• S3 sig. higher 
ratings of  
negative 
symptoms than 
S2, who were 
sig. higher than 
SI
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
showed
impairments of 
disengagement 
and mentalising
• Impairments in 
mentalising 
associated with 
negative 
symptoms, but 
not after exec 
function 
controlled for
18. Langdon, •
Davies &
Coltheart •
(2002)
19. Langdon, •
Coltheart,
Ward & Catts •
(2002)
25 patients with 
schizophrenia 
20 healthy controls
• Picture 
sequencing 
task: Social 
script/ 
mechanical/ 
false belief/ 
capture stories
• Story 
comprehensio 
n task testing 
understanding 
o f metaphor 
and irony
• Spot the word 
test
25 patients with 
schizophrenia 
20 healthy controls
script/ 
mechanical/ 
false belief/ 
capture stories
• Story 
comprehensio 
n task testing 
understanding 
o f metaphor 
and irony
• Spot the word 
test
• Tower of
• Picture 
sequencing 
task: Social
London task
• Patients not put into 
subgroups according 
to symptoms
• Patients divided into 
positive and negative 
formal thought 
disorder subgroups 
according to scores 
on SAPS and SANS
• Patients made 
more errors than 
controls in false 
belief, capture 
and mechanical 
sequences
• Patients sig 
more impaired 
in ability to 
recognise non­
literal speech
• Patients 
performed more 
poorly than 
controls in all 
ToM tasks
• Errors in false 
belief task 
predicted errors 
in irony task but 
not metaphor 
task
• Poor 
understanding of 
metaphor 
predicted 
negative FTD
• Poor 
understanding of 
irony predicted 
positive FTD
Metaphor and 
irony
comprehension
involve
distinctive
cognitive
processes
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20. • 25 patients with • Verbal ToM
Harrington, schizophrenia task: cartoon
Langdon, • 38 healthy controls pictures +
Siegert & words (FB and
McClure deception)
(2005) •  Non-verbal
ToM task: 
picture 
sequencing 
(FB/
mechanical/ 
Social script/ 
capture)
• Block design 
and Vocab 
subtests from 
WA1S-R
21. Herold, 
Tenyi, 
Lenard & 
Trixler 
(2002)
22. Tenyi, 
Herold, Szili 
& Trixler 
(2002)
20 patients with paranoid 
schizophrenia in remission 
20 healthy controls
• 26 patients with paranoid
schizophrenia
• 26 healthy controls
T'and 2nd 
order stories 
tasks from 
Doody et al. 
(1998)
2 metaphor 
and irony 
stories tasks 
from Drury et 
al. (1998)
4 question and
answer
vignettes
testing maxim
o f relevance
WA1S
PANSS
Patients grouped into 
paranoid vs. non­
paranoid groups 
based on SAPS 
persecutory delusions 
scores
PANSS
Symptom subgroups 
not investigated
No symptom 
subgrouping
• Patients 
performed more 
poorly overall
•  Persecutory 
delusions 
predicted ToM 
task
performance
• Paranoid group 
performed more 
poorly on verbal 
rather than non­
verbal tasks
• Positive FTD 
also sig. 
correlated with 
ToM
performance
• Schizophrenia 
patients worse 
on irony task, 
not on other 
tasks
• Patients made 
more errors 
decoding the 
violated maxims 
than controls
No IQ control
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23. Doody,
Gotz,
Johnstone,
Frith &
Cunningham-
Owens
(1998)
28 patients with 
schizophrenia 
12 patients with affective 
disorder
19 patients with mild 
learning disability
18 patients with 
schizophrenia and mild 
learning disability
20 healthy controls
NART 
Quick Test 
SADS-L 
PANSS 
Sally-Anne 
Taskusing 
dolls and 
props
Ice-cream van 
task using map 
and dolls
Symptoms studied • Patients with
using PANSS schizophrenia
performed worst 
on tasks
• Deficit in 
schizophrenia 
not entirely 
accounted for by
IQ
• Sig. association 
between 
negative 
symptoms and 
performance
24. Druiy, • 14 patients with
Robinson & schizophrenia
Birchwood • 10 psychotic controls
(1998) • 12 depressed controls
3 2nd order 
false belief 
story tasks, 
read aloud 
twice plus 
props
substitution of
co-referential
term story
task, read
aloud plus
props
metaphor
sentence
completion
irony and
metaphor
picture
completion
subtest o f
WAIS-R
PAS
Participants re-tested 
on remission of 
illness 
Grouped for 
comparison through 
diagnosis and 
Psychiatric 
Assessment Scale
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed worst 
on tasks
• All patients 
performed better 
on remission, 
apart from those 
with persecutory 
delusions
• Deluded group 
performed as 
well as non­
deluded gp 
during acute 
phase, but worse 
on remission
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
poorer on 
metaphor but 
not irony tasks
IQ not related to 
performance
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25. Mitchley, •
Barber, Gray,
Brooks & •
Livingston
(1998)
18 patients with chronic 
schizophrenia 
13 non-psychotic 
psychiatric controls
• Comprehensio 
n o f irony task, 
read by 
participants
• Raven’s 
progressive 
matrices
• NART
26. Walston, 
Blennerhasse 
tt & Charlton 
(2000)
4 patients with “pure” 
persecutory delusions and 
no other psychopathology
ToM tests:
Humorous
cartoons,
written
narratives,
hinting task
PANSS rating used, 
participants not 
divided into groups
Case study design
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed 
worse on irony 
task
• Performance not 
related to 
current or pre- 
morbid IQ
• Negative, and 
not positive or 
general, PANSS 
scale correlated 
with irony 
scores
All 4 cases Not intended to
performed at be
near perfect representative
levels on all population
ToM tasks sample
Does not imply
that all patients
with persecutory
delusions have
impaired ToM
due to design
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27. Mazza, 
De Risio, 
Surian, 
Roncone & 
Casacchia 
(2001)
35 patients with
schizophrenia
17 healthy controls
• 4 1st and 2nd 
order false 
belief stories, 
read aloud
• Verbal 
memory test
• Verbal fluency 
test
• Tower of  
London test
• Wisconsin 
card sorting 
test
28. Pollice, • 44 patients with • 4 1st & 2nd
Roncone, schizphrenia order ToM
Falloon, stories, read
Mazza, De aloud
Risio, • Raven’s
Necozione, standard
Morosini & progressive
Casacchia matrices
(2002) • Verbal
memory test
• Verbal 
Fluency test
• Tower of 
London test
• WCST
Patients assessed 
using SAPS and 
SANS: divided into 3 
groups according to 
Liddle’s (1987) 
model- reality 
distortion (N=8), 
psychomotor poverty 
(N=16), 
disorganisation 
(N=16)
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed 
worse on ToM 
stories than 
controls
• Psychomotor 
poverty group 
worse than other 
two groups
Brief psychiatric • No healthy
rating scale- no control group
symptom subgroups • Symptom
Disability assessment ratings did not
schedule correlate with
ToM scores
Groups matched 
on IQ and Exec 
function
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29. Janssen, 
Krabbendam, 
Jolles & van 
Os (2003)
• 43 psychotic patients in •
remission
• 41 non-psychotic 1st
degree relatives •
• 43 healthy controls •
False belief
story task,
read aloud
Hinting task
Digit span
backwards
Auditory
verbal learning
task
Animal
naming
Strrop colour
word test
Concept
shifting test
Groningen
Intelligence
test
BPRS
PANSS
PDI
• No symptom 
subgrouping
• Patients in 
remission 
performed worst 
on hinting task, 
followed by 
relatives, 
followed by 
controls
• Patients in 
remission also 
worse on FB 
task, but not sig.
Only 1st order 
FB task used, no 
2nd order or 
above
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30. Greig, 
Bryson & 
Bell (2004)
128 patients with 
schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder
Hinting task 
Gorham’s 
proverbs 
SCID
Continuous
performance
task
Hopkins’ 
verbal learning 
test
Trail making 
WA1S-R
WCST
Symptoms assessed 
using PANSS and 
SAPS
• Patients with 
disorganized 
schizophrenia 
performed most 
poorly
• ToM 
performance 
correlated with 
thought disorder
• ToM 
performance 
related to 
PANSS delusion 
items, PANSS 
negative 
component, 
PANSS positive 
component
• No correlation 
between ToM 
performance and 
SAPS
persecutory 
delusions items
• ToM 
performance 
related to 
memory and 
verbal memory
31. Kelemen, 
Keri, Must, 
Benedek & 
Janka (2004)
32. Brune 
(2005)
79 first degree biological 
relatives o f schizophrenia 
patients: 65 unaffected 
relatives; 14 affected 
relatives
40 healthy controls
Eyes test 
WA1S-R 
Mini-
international 
neuropsychiatr 
ic interview 
plus
23 patients with 
schizophrenia 
18 healthy controls
Pictures of
Facial Affect
6 cartoon
picture
sequencing
stories
ToM
questionnaire 
referring to 
picture 
sequencing 
task
Verbal IQ- 
MWT test 
Executive 
function- 
computerized 
WCST; 2 
subtests from 
BADS
No symptom • Affected Evidence for
subgrouping relatives state rather than
performed trait model
worse than
unaffected and
healthy controls
Symptoms assessed • Patients with When IQ and
using PANSS schizophrenia executive
Social functioning performed function
assessed using SBS worse on exec controlled for,
function tests, patients
emotion remained poorer
recognition test at emotion
(apart from recognition and
‘reciprocity’ and 
‘happiness’) and 
2nd order ToM 
task
• PANSS scores 
not correlated 
with ToM scores
ToM tasks
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33.Brune& •
Bodenstein
(2005)
31 patients with
schizophrenia
21 healthy controls
proverbs test 
picture 
sequencing 
ToM
questionnaire
MWT
Spot the word 
test 
WCST 
Zoo map test
34. Majoram, 
Miller, 
Lawrie, 
Johnstone, 
Gardiner, & 
Bums (2005)
15 patients with 
schizophrenia 
15 psychiatric controls 
(bipolar disorder, n=7, and 
depression, n=8)
15 healthy controls
extended 
hinting task, 
with 10 new 
items 
Quick test
• Symptoms assessed 
using PANSS
• All patients divided 
into groups according 
to Krawiecka et al 
(1977) standardized 
scale for rating 
chronic psychotic 
patients
• None/low or 
moderate/severe 
delusions
• None/low or 
moderate/severe 
hallucinations
• Patients 
performed 
worse on ToM 
tests
• Proverbs score 
correlated with 
picture 
sequencing 
score
• No association 
between proverb 
score/ picture 
sequencing 
score and 
PANSS scores
• Patients with 
schizophrenia 
performed worst 
on hinting task
• Poor 
performance sig. 
associated with 
moderate/severe 
delusions and 
hallucinations
• No sig. 
association 
between
performance and 
negative
symptoms______
1st study to show 
similar
impairment in 
other patient 
groups with 
psychosis, i.e. 
bipolar group
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Appendix 2
Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA; Claridge & Broks, 1984)
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RESEARCH PROJECT for DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
SCHIZOTYPY, THEORY OF MIND AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF IRONY
D o you  b e liev e  in telepathy? Y  N
D o you  often  fee l that other people have it in for you? Y  N
W hen in the dark do you  see shapes and forms even though there’s nothing there? Y  N
If you  say you  w ill do som ething, do you  alw ays keep your prom ise no matter how  Y  N
inconvenient it m ight be?
D oes you  ow n v o ic e  ever seem  distant, far away? Y  N
D oes it often  happen that alm ost every thought im m ediately and automatically suggests and Y  N
enorm ous num ber o f  ideas?
D o you ever b ecom e oversensitive to light or noise? Y  N
W ere you  ever greedy by help ing  y o u rse lf to  m ore than your share o f  anything? Y  N
D o you often have v iv id  dreams that disturb your sleep? Y  N
W hen you  are worried or anxious do you  have trouble w ith your bow els? Y  N
H ave you  ever fe lt w hen  you  looked  in the mirror that your face seem ed different? Y  N
Have you ever blam ed som eone for doing som ething you  knew  w as really your fault? Y  N
D o you fee l it is safer to trust nobody? Y  N
D o things som etim es fee l as i f  they w ere not real? Y  N
D o you fee l lon ely  m ost o f  the tim e even  w hen you are w ith  people? Y  N
Are a ll  your habits good  and desirable ones? Y  N
D o everyday things som etim es seem  unusually large or sm all? Y  N
Are you  often  bothered by the feelin g  that people are w atching you? Y  N
D o you  fee l that you  cannot get ‘c lo se ’ to other people? Y  N
H ave you  ever taken anything (even  a pin or button) that belonged to som eone else? Y  N
D o you  dread go in g  into a room by y ou rself where other people are already gathered and Y  N
talking?
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D o es your sen se o f  sm ell som etim es becom e unusually strong? Y N
A re you som etim es sure that other people can tell what you are thinking? Y  N
H ave you  ever broken or lost som ething that belongs to som eone else? Y  N
H ave you  ever had the sensation o f  your body or part o f  it changing shape? Y  N
D o you ever fee l sure that som ething is about to happen even thought there doesn’t seem  to be Y  N
any reason for you  thinking that?
D o you ever suddenly fee l distracted by distant sounds that you are not norm ally aware of? Y  N
Have you  ever said  anything bad or nasty about anyone? Y  N
D o you ever have a vague sense o f  danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do not Y  N
understand?
Have you  ever thought yo u  heard people talking on ly  to discover that it w as in fact som e Y  N
nondescript noise?
D o your thoughts ever stop suddenly causing you  to interrupt what y o u ’re doing? Y  N
A s a child w ere you  ever cheeky to your parents? Y  N
D o you fee l that y o u  have to be on your guard even with your friends? Y  N
D o you ever fee l that your thoughts don’t belong to you? Y  N
When in a crow ded room  do you  often have d ifficulty in fo llow ing a conversation? Y  N
Have you ever cheated at a gam e? Y  N
D o you som etim es fee l that your accidents are caused by m ysterious forces? Y  N
D o you fee l at tim es that people are talking about you? Y  N
D o you b e liev e  that dreams can com e true? Y  N
Have you  ever taken advantage o f  som eone? Y  N
D o you ever fee l that your speech is d ifficult to understand because the words are all m ixed up Y  N
and don’t m ake sense?
Are your thoughts som etim es so strong that you can alm ost hear them? Y  N
W hen com in g  into a new  situation have you  ever felt strongly that it w as a repeat o f  som ething Y  N
that has happened before?
D o you a lw ays practice what you  preach? Y  N
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H ave you  ever fe lt that you  w ere com m unicating with another person telepathically? Y  N
Are you  easily  distracted from work by daydreams? Y  N
Are you  very hurt by criticism ? Y  N
D o you  som etim es put o f f  until tom orrow what you ought to do today? Y  N
D o you  ever get nervous w hen som eone is w alking behind you? Y  N
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Appendix 3
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences
(O-LIFE; Mason et aL, 1995)
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Do you often have a day when indoor lights seem so bright they bother your eyes? Y N
Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things? Y N
Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation? Y N
Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of person? Y N
Are the sounds you hear in your daydreams usually clear and distinct? Y N
Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a group of people that you know 
more or less?
Y N
Have you had very little fun from physical activities like walking, swimming or sports? Y N
Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food? Y N
Are your thoughts sometimes as real as actual events in your life? Y N
Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said? Y N
Has dancing, or the idea o f it, always seemed dull to you? Y N
When with groups o f people, do you usually prefer to let someone else be the centre of 
attention?
Y N
Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and automatically suggests an 
enormous number o f ideas?
Y N
When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty following the conversation? Y N
Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed? Y N
When you catch a train do you often arrive at the last minute? Y N
Are your thoughts sometimes so strong you can almost hear them? Y N
No matter how hard you try to concentrate, do unrelated thoughts always creep into your mind? Y N
Are there very few things that you have ever really enjoyed doing? Y N
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Do you often change between intense liking and disliking of the same person? Y N
Do you think you could learn to read others’ minds if you wanted to? Y N
Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do? Y N
Are you much too independent to really get on with other people? Y N
Have you ever cheated at a game? Y N
Have you felt that you have special, almost magical powers? Y N
Do you easily lose courage when you are criticised or failing in something? Y N
Do you think having close friends is not as important as some people say? Y N
Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking? Y N
Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express them all? Y N
Do you seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily? Y N
Are you rather lively? Y N
Are you usually in an average sort o f mood, not too high and not too low? Y N
Can some people make you aware o f them just be thinking about you? Y N
Are you sometimes so nervous that you are ‘blocked’? Y N
Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are tired or sore? Y N
Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects? Y N
Does a passing thought sometimes seem so real that it frightens you? Y N
Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time? Y N
Do you like mixing with people? Y N
Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? Y N
Does you voice ever seem distant, faraway? Y N
Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered and are Y jN
talking?
On seeing a soft, thick carpet have you sometimes had the impulse to take your shoes off and Y 
walk barefoot on it?
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Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you know was really your fault? Y N
Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces? Y N
Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts when you are thinking? Y N
Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with most others? Y N
Would being in debt worry you? Y N
Do people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you sometimes think they are? Y N
Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life? Y N
Can just being friends make you feel really good? Y N
Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their future with savings and insurance? Y N
Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become uncomfortable? Y N
Do you worry about awful things that might happen to you? Y N
Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you? Y N
Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things? Y N
Have you ever felt that you might cause something to happen just be thinking too much about it? Y N
Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? Y N
When things are bothering you, do you like to talk to other people about it? Y N
Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself? Y N
Are you so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares you? Y N
Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time? Y N
Do you have many friends? Y N
Would it make you nervous to play the clown in from of other people? Y N
Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do not Y N
understand?
Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? Y IS!
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Do you prefer watching television to going out with other people? Y N
Have you ever taken advantage of someone? Y N
Have you sometimes had the feeling of gaining or loosing energy when certain people look at Y N
you or touch you?
Do you often feel lonely? Y N
Is it true that your relationships with other people never get very intense? Y N
Would you like other people to be afraid of you? Y N
Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in fact some Y N
nondescript noise?
Do you often experience an overwhelming sense of emptiness? Y N
Do you love having your back massaged? Y N
Do you often have an urge to hit someone? Y N
Have you occasionally felt as if your body did not exist? Y N
Do you often feel ‘fed up’? Y N
Is it fun to sing with other people? Y N
Do people who drive carefully annoy you? Y N
On occasions, have you seen a person’s face in front of you when no one was in fact there? Y N
Would you call yourself a nervous person? Y N
Do people who try to get to know you usually give up after a while? Y N
Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about? Y N
Have you ever wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living? Y N
Is it hard for you to make decisions? Y N
Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party? Y N
Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest, even thought you know Y N
they are right?
Have you ever felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not your own? Y N
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Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all mixed up 
and don’t make sense?
Y N
Are the bright lights of a city exciting to look at? Y N
Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can’t afford? Y N
Now and then when you look in the mirror, does your face seem quite different than usual? Y N
Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone? Y N
Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds of foods? Y N
Do you like going out a lot? Y N
Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally aware of? Y N
Do you feel very close to your friends? Y N
When in the dark, do you often see shapes and forms even though there’s nothing there? Y N
Do you feel that making new friends isn’t worth the energy it takes? Y N
Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, although you could not see it? Y N
Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? Y N
Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even though there does not seem to be 
any reason for you thinking that?
Y N
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Theory of Mind Task
Theory o f Mind and physical control stories from Pickup (2006) 
Practice story
On Christmas Eve, Alice’s mother takes her to the big department store in 
town. They go to look in the toy department. In the toy department Mr 
Brown, Alice’s next door neighbour, is dressed up as Santa Claus, giving 
out sweets to all the children. Alice thinks she recognises Mr Brown, so she 
runs up to him and asks, “Who are you?” Mr Brown answers, “I’m Santa 
Claus!”
Q: Why does he say this?
1.
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this; he knows that Simon 
never tells the truth! Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong paddle, 
and Jim knows Simon has hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it. 
He's very cross. So he finds Simon and he says, "Where is my ping-pong 
paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard or under your bed, 
because I've looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the cupboard or under 
your bed?" Simon tells him the paddle is under his bed.
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the paddle?
2 .
During the war, the Red army captures a member of the Blue army. They 
want him to tell them where his army's tanks are; they know they are either 
by the sea or in the mountains. They know that the prisoner will not want 
to tell them, he will want to save his army, and so he will certainly lie to 
them. The prisoner is very brave and very clever; he will not let them find 
his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when the other side 
ask him where his tanks are, he says, "They are in the mountains".
Q: Why did the prisoner say that?
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3.
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his favourite meal - sausages 
and beans. He is a very greedy boy, and he would like to have more 
sausages than anybody else, even though his mother will have made him a 
lovely meal when he gets home! But everyone is allowed two sausages and 
no more. When it is Brian's turn to be served, he says, "Oh, please can I 
have four sausages, because I won't be having any dinner when I get 
home!"
Q: Why does Brian say this?
4.
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of 
kittens she didn't want. Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn't 
do anything to harm them, though she couldn't keep them all herself. When 
Jill visited she wasn't sure she wanted one of Mrs. Smith's kittens, since 
they were all males and she had wanted a female. But Mrs. Smith said, "If 
no one buys the kittens I'll just have to drown them!"
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that?
5.
One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter. Now Peter loves his aunt very 
much, but today she is wearing a new hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is 
very ugly indeed. Peter thinks his aunt looks silly in it and much nicer in 
her old hat. But when Aunt Jane asks Peter, "How do you like my new 
hat?”, Peter says, "Oh, its very nice".
Q: Why does he say that?
6.
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she 
could ask her parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than
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anything in the world. At last Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to 
unwrap the big box her parents had given her. She felt sure it would 
contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all the family 
standing round, she found her present was just a boring old set of 
encyclopaedias, which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen's 
parents asked her how she liked her Christmas present, she said, "It's lovely, 
thank you. It's just what I wanted".
Q: Why did she say this?
7.
Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home. She doesn't like walking 
home alone in the dark because she is always afraid that someone will 
attack her and rob her. She really is a very nervous person! Suddenly, out 
of the shadows comes a man. He wants to ask Mrs. Peabody what time it 
is, so he walks towards her. When Mrs. Peabody sees the man coming 
towards her, she starts to tremble and says, "Take my purse, just don't hurt 
me please!"
Q: Why did she say that?
8 .
A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is 
running home, a policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't 
know the man is a burglar; he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. 
But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, "Hey, you! Stop!", the 
burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his 
hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.
Q: Why did the burglar do that?
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9.
Two enemy powers have been at war for a very long time. Each army has 
won several battles, but now the outcome could go either way. The forces 
are equally matched. However, the Blue army is stronger than the Yellow 
army in foot soldiers and artillery. But the Yellow army is stronger than the 
Blue Army in air power. On the day o f the final battle, which will decide 
the outcome of the war, there is heavy fog over the mountains where the 
fighting is about to occur. Low-lying clouds hang above the soldiers. By 
the end o f the day the Blue army has won.
Q: Why did the Blue army win?
10.
A burglar is about to break into a jewellers’ shop. He skilfully picks the 
lock on the shop door. Carefully he crawls under the electronic detector 
beam. If he breaks this beam it will set off the alarm. Quietly he opens the 
door of the store-room and sees the gems glittering. As he reaches out, 
however, he steps on something soft. He hears a screech and something 
small and furry runs out past him, towards the shop door. Immediately the 
alarm sounds.
Q: Why did the alarm go off?
11 .
Mrs. Simpson, the librarian, receives a special book which she has to 
catalogue and find an appropriate place for. She has to decide which 
section to file it under. The library is very big, and has different sections on 
many different subjects. The new book is about plants and their medical 
uses, and is heavily illustrated. However, Mrs. Simpson does not put it on 
the shelf with the rest o f the books on botany. Neither does she put it with 
the books on medicine. Instead, she carefully takes it into a separate room. 
In this room all the books are kept in special cases and the temperature is 
kept constant.
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Q: Why did she do this?
12.
Henry is preparing for a big dinner party. He is famous for his excellent 
mayonnaise. He has bought lots of fresh eggs. The recipe says, "Carefully 
separate the yolks o f six eggs and add oil very gradually". He has already 
bought easily enough dessert to feed everyone. However, he now looks up 
the recipe for meringues. Henry will not waste anything.
Q: Why does Henry make meringues?
13.
Paul is very rich, and today he is going to buy an expensive new car. He is 
considering whether to make a single payment, or whether to spread the 
cost over the year. If he pays in monthly instalments, the dealer will charge 
five percent interest on the loan. His bank currently gives him eight percent 
interest on the money in his account. Even though he has easily enough 
money to pay the full amount, he decides to pay by monthly instalments.
Q: Why does he do that?
14.
Old Mrs. Robinson is very frail. One day she slips on her icy door step and 
falls on her side. She gets up right away, although she feels quite bruised 
and shaken. The next day her leg feels very stiff and she can scarcely walk. 
She makes her way to the doctors. As soon as the doctor hears about the 
fall, and sees her swollen side, he says, "Go immediately to the hospital". 
At the hospital they take an X-ray.
Q: Why did they take an X-ray?
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15.
Sarah is very far-sighted. She has only one pair o f glasses, which she keeps 
losing. Today she has lost her glasses again and she needs to find them. 
She had them yesterday evening when she looked up the television 
programs. She must have left them somewhere that she has been today. 
She asks Ted to find her glasses. She tells him that today she went to her 
regular early morning exercise class, then to the post office, and last to the 
flower shop. Ted goes straight to the post office.
Q: Why is the post office the most likely place to look?
16.
John is going shopping. He buys a nice new desk lamp, for his study. He 
needs a light bulb for his new lamp. He goes from the furniture department 
to the electrical department. In the electrical department he finds that there 
are two brands o f light bulb of the right kind. Everbrite light bulbs cost less 
in single packs than Literite bulbs. However, only Literite bulbs come in 
multi-packs o f six. John buys the multi-pack, even though he only needs 
one bulb.
Q: Why does John buy the Literite bulbs?
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Understanding of Irony task 
Irony Stories taken Mitchley et al. (1998)
1.
Lisa couldn’t go to school because o f the snow. “What a pity!” she said, 
smiling. “I’ll miss my maths test.”
What did Lisa mean?
2 .
Tanya looked round her brother Gareth’s flat: there were no signs o f last 
night’s party. “I see you’ve tidied up” she said.
What did Tanya mean?
3.
Chris’s three goals secured a victory for his team on Saturday. After the 
game, Kevin congratulated him: “You’ve played well today, Chris.”
What does Kevin mean?
4.
Andy and Darryl walked out o f the cinema after only half an hour. “Well 
that was a great film,” said Andy.
What did Andy mean?
5.
Mary’s boss would not give her time off to visit her granny in hospital. As 
she left her boss’ office, Mary said angrily, “Thanks for being so 
understanding.”
What did Mary mean?
6.
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When Bill and Steve entered the pub, they found it was so busy they had 
difficulty getting to the bar. Bill remarked, “it’s really lively in here 
tonight.”
What did Bill mean?
7.
Fred looked at his race card; none of his horses had even been placed. 
“Another successful day,” he sighed.
What did Fred mean?
8 .
“What a tidy piece o f work,” said that teacher, handing back Claire’s 
perfectly typewritten homework.
What did the teacher mean?
9.
Robbie had just finished his third helping o f pie, and was asking his mother 
if there was any more. “What a dainty appetite you have, Robbie,” replied 
his mother.
What did Robbie’s mother mean?
10 .
Although it was the first time he had been skating, Mike had no problem 
balancing on the ice and was soon confident enough to skate backwards. 
“I’ve got a natural talent for skating,” said Mike.
What did Mike mean?
11.
Sitting down to his tea Mr Jones exclaimed, “what and enormous meal!” 
“You don’t have to eat it all,” replied his wife.
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What did Mr Jones mean?
12.
As they left the pub, Richard said “that was sensitive o f you, Tom”. “How 
was I to know Mark had just split up with his girlfriend?” protested Tom.
What did Richard mean?
13.
Karen and Jane were out on a Sunday afternoon drive. “What a lovely day,” 
said Karen. “We’ve been lucky with the weather,” replied Jane.
What did Karen mean?
14.
As Sarah arrived, John looked at his watch and said, “punctual as ever.” 
“Sorry, I had to wait ages for the bus,” replied Sarah.
What did John mean?
15.
Mr Wilson was putting up shelves in the living room. “What a professional 
job!” exclaimed his wife when she came to see how he was getting on. 
“Well it’s easy when you know how,” replied Mr Wilson, proudly.
What did Mrs Wilson mean?
16.
“Have we been burgled?” said Jack, walking into the bedroom. “Sorry 
about the mess, I was just cleaning out some old clothes,” replied his wife.
What did Jack mean?
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17.
“I didn’t know it was supposed to be fancy dress tonight,” said Mr Harris, 
as he saw what his daughter Anne was wearing for the party. “Very funny, 
Dad,” replied Anne. “You haven’t got a clue about fashion.”
What did Mr Harris mean?
18.
“I can see you put a lot o f work into the garden,” said Paul. “Yes, well I’m 
hoping to enter the local gardening competition,” replied Jim.
What did Paul mean?
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Participant information sheet and consent form
INFORMATION SHEET FOR VOLUNTEERS
Study Title: Schizotypy, theory of mind and the understanding of irony: an
investigation
Investigators: Ben Barnaby, Department of Clinical Health Psychology,
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Dr G. Pickup, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
You are invited to participate in a research project which investigates the relationship between 
certain personality traits and the ability to work out what other people think in particular 
situations. As a healthy volunteer, the data you provide will give us information about the 
normal variation in people’s understanding of social situations.
You will be asked to complete a brief screening questionnaire. On the basis of this you may 
then be asked to participate in the study. This would entail completing one more questionnaire, 
answering questions on some stories and completing two short tests o f intelligence and 
reasoning ability. This interview takes approximately one hour in total. Your answers to all 
these questions will be completely confidential and identified only by a number rather than by 
your name. You will receive £10 for taking part, which is a ‘thank you’ gesture from us.
There are no potential risks involved in the research.
You do not have to take part m this study if you do not want to. If you decide to take part 
you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.
All proposals for research using human subjects are reviewed by an ethics committee 
before they can proceed. This proposal was reviewed by the UCL Committee on the Ethics 
of Human Research.
Please feel free to ask any questions about the research, and we will do our best to answer them.
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CONFIDENTIAL 
CONSENT FORM FOR VOLUNTEERS
Study Title: Schizotypy, theory of mind and the understanding of irony: an
investigation
Investigators: Ben Barnaby, Department of Clinical Health Psychology,
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Dr G. Pickup, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Tel: 
Yes No
Have you read the Participant Information sheet?
Has the project been explained to you orally?
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Have you received enough information about the study? 
Who have you spoken to?..........................................
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study without penalty 
at any stage?
Do you agree with the publication of the results of this study in an appropriate 
outlet/s?
Comment or Concerns During the Study
If you have any comments or concerns you should discuss these with the Principal Researcher. If 
you wish to go further and complain about any aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course of the study, you should email the Chair of the UCL Committee for the 
Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research rgradschoolhead@ucl.ac.ukI or send a letter to: The Graduate 
School, North Cloisters, Wilkins Building, UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT who will take 
the complaint forward as necessary.
Signed:............................................. Date.
Full Name in Capitals:........................................................
Signature of Witness:..................................................Date
Full Name in Capitals:........................................................
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Ethical approval conformation letter
UC3L
g r a d u a t e
^ C H O O ^
The Graduate School
University College London 
Gower Street London WC1E6BT
Professor Leslie C Aiello Tel: 020 7679 7844
Head of the Graduate School Fax: 020 7679 7043
Email: qradschoolhead@ucl.ac.uk
13 May 2005 
Dr Graham Pickup
Sub-department of Clinical Health Psychology 
4th Floor
1-19 Torrington Place 
UCL
Dear Dr Pickup
Re: Notification of Ethical Approval
: Schizotypy. theory of mind and the understanding of irony
The above research has been given ethical approval following review by the Chair of the 
UCL Committee for the Ethics of non-NHS Human Research for the duration of the project 
subject to the following conditions:
1. You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this 
approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be 
treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed 
separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek 
confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval 
Request Form’.
The form identified can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: 
http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked 'Key Responsibilities of 
the Researcher Following Approval’.
2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse 
events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse 
events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform Ms Helen Dougal, Ethics 
Committee Administrator (h.dougal@ucl.ac.uk), within ten days of an adverse incident 
occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the 
participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics 
Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the 
next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.
